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Abstract 
The Economic Value of Rebuilding Fisheries 
Christopher Costello
1
, Brian P. Kinlan
2
, Sarah E. Lester
3
,
  
and Steven D. Gaines
1 
The global demand for protein from seafood – whether wild, caught or cultured, 
whether for direct consumption or as feed for livestock – is high and projected to continue 
growing. However, the ocean’s ability to meet this demand is uncertain due to either 
mismanagement or, in some cases, lack of management of marine fish stocks. Efforts to 
rebuild and recover the world’s fisheries will benefit from an improved understanding of 
the long-term economic benefits of recovering collapsed stocks, the trajectory and 
duration of different rebuilding approaches, variation in the value and timing of recovery 
for fisheries with different economic, biological, and regulatory characteristics, including 
identifying which fisheries are likely to benefit most from recovery, and the benefits of 
avoiding collapse in the first place. These questions are addressed using a dynamic 
bioeconomic optimisation model that explicitly accounts for economics, management, 
and ecology of size-structured exploited fish populations. Within this model framework, 
different management options (effort controls on small-, medium-, and large-sized fish) 
including management that optimises economic returns over a specified planning horizon 
are simulated and the consequences compared. The results show considerable economic 
gains from rebuilding fisheries, with magnitudes varying across fisheries. 
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The Economic Value of Rebuilding Fisheries 
Introduction 
The global demand for protein from seafood – whether wild caught or cultured, 
whether for direct consumption or as feed for livestock – is high and projected to continue 
growing (Duarte et al. 2009). However, the ocean’s ability to meet this demand has been 
called into question. Recent estimates suggest that 28% of global fisheries are 
overexploited, depleted or recovering from depletion, with an additional 52% at or close 
to their maximum sustainable limits (FAO 2009). Fishing fleets have responded by 
expanding their reach into new and deeper waters (Roberts 2002, Pauly et al. 2005). But 
living marine resources are not inexhaustible, as evidenced by global catches of wild 
caught seafood peaking in the late 1980s and declining slightly since (Watson and Pauly 
2001). Continuing catch declines are predicted as more and more fisheries collapse 
(Worm et al. 2006), accompanied by dramatic changes to the trophic structure and 
functioning of marine ecosystems (Pauly et al. 1998, Jackson et al. 2001, Myers and 
Worm 2003). Furthermore, many capture fisheries are reliant on destructive fishing 
practices that further impact ecosystem health. This growing body of evidence suggests 
that global fisheries as a whole are increasingly unsustainable (UNEP 2006, Worm et al. 
2006), which poses a serious threat to the social and economic welfare of fishing 
communities and those reliant on seafood. 
Unsustainable harvests of marine fish stocks can largely be attributed to 
mismanagement and in some cases, lack of management. Most fish stocks are managed as 
common pool or open access resources, models of management that lead to the ―Tragedy 
of the Commons‖ (Hardin 1968) where fishermen race against each other to catch as 
large a fraction of the yield as they can. The race for fish is in the best interest of 
individual fishermen since they lack security of ownership, but this race ultimately leads 
to the economic and often also the ecological collapse of the fishery. This failure of open 
access management suggests a solution; property-rights based approaches to fisheries 
management are gaining increasing prominence as a means for correctly aligning 
incentives to insure the long-term prosperity of fisheries and fishing communities 
(Costello et al. 2008, Festa et al. 2008). Indeed, it is now widely agreed that we have the 
necessary management toolbox to rebuild collapsed fisheries (Worm et al. 2009), though 
the benefits from doing so have not been carefully explored. 
In addition to degrading ocean ecosystems and limiting our future access to wild 
caught seafood, over-exploitation of the world’s fisheries has been shown to have severe 
economic consequences. Using highly simplified steady state models, the World Bank 
report ―The Sunken Billions" has estimated a global loss of approximately USD 50 
billion annually associated with mismanagement (Arnason et al. 2009). Over the past 
three decades, this would imply a cumulative global loss of USD 2 trillion comparing 
actual versus potential net economic benefits. Even more alarming, this may be a 
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conservative estimate as it excludes potential economic costs of current fishery 
management to the recreational fishing sector, ocean-related tourism sector, and seafood 
processors and distributors. Although the Sunken Billions analysis draws much needed 
attention to the potential economic value of rebuilding global fisheries by reducing effort, 
its methodology and results have been criticised for being overly generalised. Regardless, 
it is but a starting point as it does not account for the heterogeneity that exists across 
fisheries, countries, and ecosystems, and thus provides little in the way of concrete 
guidance for how to design rebuilding plans for particular fish stocks or how to prioritise 
recovery efforts among fisheries based on expected returns. Moreover, it does not 
explicitly examine the dynamic paths of fishery recovery, for example, addressing the 
questions of whether optimal rebuilding plans include a temporary fishery closure, and 
how and when fishing should resume.  
Recovering ailing fisheries is likely to incur short-term costs, including job losses and 
lost revenues, during the transition to more sustainable catch levels. As a result, 
rebuilding efforts are often hindered by the real or perceived short-term costs of 
rebuilding, with little acknowledgement of potential long-term benefits. Balancing 
economic gains against social and political resistance to the implementation of recovery 
plans requires evidence of the magnitude and time course of likely longer-term benefits. 
Sumaila and Suatoni (2005) partially address this need for 17 federally managed fish 
stocks in the United States that have been declared over-fished (i.e. their abundance is 
below a specified biomass threshold). The authors determine the net present value (NPV) 
that can be derived from rebuilding these stocks by comparing a current catch scenario 
that assumes recent catch patterns will continue unchanged, to a rebuilding scenario that 
projects catches based on the adopted rebuilding plan for that fishery. They found that 
rebuilding scenarios yielded three times the NPV of current catch scenarios. This analysis 
illustrates the utility of a dynamic bioeconomic approach, but it does not investigate how 
the adopted recovery plans (determined by regulatory processes) compare to rebuilding 
plans that are economically optimal or to strategies that optimise for other goals. As such, 
it does not provide the more general insights that are needed for recovering fisheries 
worldwide.  
Efforts to rebuild and recover the world’s fisheries, whether collapsed or heading 
towards collapse, will benefit greatly from an improved understanding of:  
 the long-term economic benefits of recovering collapsed stocks,  
 the trajectory and duration of different rebuilding approaches, 
 variation in the value and timing of recovery for fisheries with different economic, 
biological, and regulatory characteristics, including identifying which fisheries are 
likely to benefit most from recovery, and  
 the benefits of avoiding collapse in the first place.  
We address these questions by developing and implementing a method for estimating 
the value of rebuilding collapsed fisheries with different ecological and economic 
characteristics and the value of avoiding collapse of those fisheries to begin with. We use 
a dynamic bioeconomic optimisation model that explicitly accounts for economics, 
management, and ecology of size-structured exploited fish populations. Within this model 
framework, we simulate and compare the consequences of different management options 
(effort controls on small, medium, and large-sised fish) including management that 
optimises economic return over a specified planning horizon. By examining the net 
present values of fisheries under management policies that rebuild fisheries or maintain 
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them in a rebuilt state, compared to those that maintain or cause collapse, we estimate the 
value of rebuilding and the benefit of avoiding collapse. We implement this procedure for 
18 model fisheries which span a spectrum of different life history, management, and 
economic characteristics. These hypothetical fisheries are representative of a large class 
of global fisheries, enabling us to assess the likely benefits of rebuilding fisheries world-
wide. We compare an economically optimal rebuilding strategy to more aggressive and 
less aggressive (with respect to the rapidity of stock recovery) rebuilding tactics. Our 
approach explicitly includes dynamics of exploited fisheries, management options for 
improving the economic value of fisheries, and life-history traits of the species being 
recovered.  
The resulting general assessment of the value of rebuilding collapsed stocks, the 
timing of stock recovery, and the value of avoiding collapse suggests appropriate 
management strategies for simultaneously rebuilding and enhancing the sustainable 
economic value of fisheries. We find that there are substantial economic gains from 
rebuilding collapsed fisheries or from avoiding collapse in the first place. However, 
realizing these economic benefits requires adopting a rational rebuilding policy. Relying 
entirely on full fishery closures can erode some of the potential economic value of 
rebuilding, although also allows fish stocks to rebound more quickly than an 
economically optimal rebuilding strategy. On the other extreme, allowing continued high 
levels of harvest to achieve short-term fishery yields can further extend rebuilding times 
and results in a net loss of economic value. Finally, the value of rebuilding (or of 
avoiding collapse) and the trajectories of change in stock biomass, harvest yields, and 
fishery profits are related to underlying life history characteristics of the fish stock, as 
well as to economic and regulatory parameters of the fishery (e.g. minimum size limits). 
This analysis suggests the possibility for the development of general guidelines for 
rebuilding strategies catered to the biological, economic, and regulatory characteristics of 
the species requiring recovery. 
Methods 
Model description 
To assess the value of rebuilding, we employ a bioeconomic modeling framework 
with three linked components. (1) A biological stock model, which represents the 
biological dynamics of the fishery (growth, natural mortality, and recruitment). It is a 
discrete time, non-spatial, size-structured population model with three size classes and 
Beverton-Holt type recruitment. (2) A harvest model, which represents fishing as a linear 
equation relating catch biomass to stock biomass for each size class via a catchability 
parameter. (3) A profit model, which represents the economic value of harvest, 
determining annual net profit and, by analyzing profits over time, calculating the net 
present value of the fish resource given a fishing policy, a discount rate, and a time 
horizon. Using the coupled stock-harvest-profit model, we then apply a numerical method 
(Value Function Iteration, implemented as described in Adda and Cooper, 2003) to 
estimate the size-targeted fishing effort policy function that maximises the net present 
value of the fishery at any given time (i.e. the "optimal policy").   
We parameterised the model to a set of 18 hypothetical fisheries spanning a wide 
range of basic biological, harvest and economic traits. Biological features of hypothetical 
fish stocks are reported in Table 1, along with the type of species on which the parameters 
are based. The example real-world fisheries and data sources that guided development of 
each hypothetical fishery are listed in the Annex (Tables A1-A3), along with an 
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explanation of the biological parameters. We used these parameters to develop a simple 
size-structured biological population model of each hypothetical species (Annex). We 
also obtained basic harvest parameters (catchability) and economic information (prices) 
from real fisheries and used them as a guide to parameterise harvest, prices and costs of 
hypothetical fisheries (Table 2).  
Equilibrium reference points and defining collapse 
Using the stock-harvest model for each hypothetical fishery, it is possible to define 
reference levels of effort, catch, and stock biomass relative to the long-run equilibrium 
state of the fishery (Figure 1). In order to produce a consistent set of reference points 
(Table 3), we calculate equilibria under constant effort with knife-edge selection of fish 
above the legal size (Hilborn and Walters 1992). An important reference point that arises 
from this analysis is the maximum sustainable yield (MSY), which is the maximum 
annual harvest the fishery can sustainably produce, given the knife-edge selectivity 
assumption. The equilibrium, fully recruited, vulnerable stock biomass at MSY is referred 
to as BMSY. We then select a definition of fishery collapse that is relative to BMSY 
(Figure 1). We define collapse as a state in which the vulnerable stock biomass is reduced 
to 50% of its value at MSY (50% of BMSY), or to as close to that level as possible under 
maximum fishing effort. However, for certain fisheries with relatively high minimum size 
limits, it may not be possible to reduce the equilibrium vulnerable biomass to 50% BMSY 
even if all vulnerable fish are removed in each year. This is based upon the guidelines for 
definition of an ―overfished‖ state currently used by the United States National Marine 
Fisheries Service (NOAA 1998: United States Code of Federal Regulations 50 
Part 600(d)(2)(ii)). The constant, knife-edge selective effort that leads to this equilibrium 
state is defined as that which brings the fishery into a collapsed state, and once collapsed, 
maintains it in that state.  
Fishing costs 
We define cost per unit effort for each fishery relative to the long-run equilibria of the 
fishery under constant effort with knife-edge selectivity, as described above. Specifically, 
we use the biological model to determine the effort level that reduces the equilibrium 
vulnerable biomass of the stock to 40% of BMSY, and chose the cost per unit effort to 
ensure that the net profit of the fishery is zero at this effort level (note: this is possible 
because we have data on price received per unit fish biomass harvested). This assumption 
may not be appropriate for some real fisheries, but ensures that all of our hypothetical 
fisheries are at least slightly profitable when they are collapsed. For generality, we 
assume that fixed costs are zero for all hypothetical fisheries. As an extension, for one of 
our hypothetical fisheries, we explore other cost scenarios, including higher and lower per 
unit effort costs and two non-zero fixed cost scenarios. 
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Figure 1. Example of the definition of maximum sustainable yield (MSY),  
collapse, and zero net profit reference points 
 
Note: Example of the definition of maximum sustainable yield (MSY), collapse, and zero 
net profit reference points relative to equilibrium revenue, cost and net profit curves. 
Equilibrium curves are drawn with respect to constant effort on all vulnerable biomass 
(i.e. knife-edge selectivity). The collapse effort policy is defined as the constant effort 
resulting in an equilibrium vulnerable biomass below 50% of its equilibrium value at MSY 
(i.e. <50% BMSY), or as close to this as possible under extinguishing effort. Cost per unit 
effort is chosen such that stock biomass at the zero net profit reference point corresponds 
to 40% BMSY, thus ensuring that the fishery is slightly profitable even at collapse. The 
resulting cost estimates are broadly representative of fisheries that do not become 
unprofitable before collapse. 
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Table 1. Biological characteristics of hypothetical fisheries 
ID Name M
2
 k Linf To Lo a b 
L 
repro 
L 
legal 
L 
medium
3
 
L 
large
3
 
Length 
measure
4
 
1 Subtropical Small Pelagic 0.80 0.38 25.8 -0.3 . 0.009 3.1 15.9 15 18.4 22.7 cm TL 
2 Subtropical Shrimp 2.18 2.04 15.9 -0.08 . 0.046 2.944 11 5.7 11.5 14.0 cm AL 
3 Subtropical Grouper 0.18 0.19 118.1 -0.425 . 0.015 2.943 64.8 61 83.1 103.1 cm TL 
4 Cold Temperate Scallop 0.11 0.38 14.7 . 0.4 0.023 2.94 4 7.1 10.1 12.7 cm SH 
5 Cold Temperate Flounder 0.23 0.29 66.9 -1.146 . 0.005 3.22 26.7 35.6 50.7 59.8 cm TL 
6 Subtropical Wrasse 0.12 0.24 43.8 -1.002 . 0.028 2.909 16.6 30.5 32.2 38.7 cm FL 
7 Subtropical Snapper 0.18 0.53 44.7 -0.630 . 0.023 2.739 20.9 30.5 33.4 39.5 cm TL 
8 Subtropical Jack 0.21 0.34 119.4 -0.45 . 0.033 2.808 82 91.4 85.4 104.5 cm FL 
9 Temperate Hake 0.28 0.3 60.9 0.03 . 0.018 2.733 37 30 41.2 52.5 cm FL 
10 Tropical/Subtrop. Lobster 0.39 0.34 19 0 . 1.264 2.803 7.25 7.6 13.0 16.4 cm CL 
11 Temperate Rockfish 0.04 0.05 49.5 -3.425 . 0.012 3.042 34 28 36.0 43.7 cm TL 
12 Subtropical Sparid 0.21 0.21 51.0 -1.32 . 0.021 2.894 28.1 35.56 37.8 45.1 cm TL 
13 Warm Temperate Snapper 0.11 0.25 89.4 -0.01 . 0.009 3.104 30.1 50.8 61.8 78.0 cm TL 
14 Cold Temperate Sole 0.13 0.15 35.8 0.47 . 0.010 3.056 28.3 10 24.1 31.0 cm TL 
15 Temperate Monkfish 0.24 0.13 130 1.510 . 0.019 2.947 39.5 43 83.2 111.2 cm TL 
16 Temperate Tilefish 0.10 0.13 107.9 0.494 . 0.005 3.26 48 40 73.4 94.0 cm FL 
17 Subtropical Clam 1.52 0.60 8.2 0 . 0.146 3.164 5 6 4 7 cm ShL 
18 Temperate Small Pelagic 0.20 0.26 47.3 -1.34 . 0.006 3.154 28.9 24.6 36.0 42.3 cm TL 
* Except as noted, all parameters were taken directly from the literature, and sources are given in Annex A.  Column headings are explained in Note 1. 
1. ID, fishery identification code used in subsequent tables; M, natural mortality (model fit, averaged across size classes); k, Von Bertalanffy growth rate; Linf, Von Bertalanffy 
asymptotic maximum length; t0, Von Bertalanffy t0 parameter; L0, Von Bertalanffy L0 parameter; a, coefficient of power-law allometric length-weight relationship; b, exponent 
of power-law allometric length-weight relationship; Lrepro, median or typical length at reproductive maturity; Llegal, median or typical length at legal size or first vulnerability to 
capture; Lmedium, length at transition from small to medium size class; Llarge, length at transition from medium to large size class; Length measure, units and type of lengths 
reported for each species. 
2. The natural mortality rate reported here is the arithmetic average of the model-fit values of M for each size class, which are reported in Annex Table A5. 
3. Lengths defining the transition from small to medium (Lmedium) and medium to large (Llarge) were derived from the growth-in-weight curve calculated by combining the 
length-weight and Von Bertalanffy growth relationships as described in Methods. 
4. TL, total length; AL, abdominal length; SH, shell height; FL, fork length; CW, carapace width; CL, carapace length; ShL, shell length. 
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Table 2. Economic and harvest characteristics of hypothetical fisheries 
ID 
Effort cost  
(2008 USD) 
Average price 
per kg (2008 
USD) 
q 
Extinguishing 
effort (1/q) 
Cost of 
extinguishing 
effort (1/q * 
effort cost) 
Effort unit 
1 48 596 0.99 7.383E-05 13544 658 178 171 Trips 
2 49 584 4.98 2.138E-03 468 23 187 624 boats 
3 653 8.15 1.311E-04 7627 4 983 807 Nominal effort units 
4 4 344 15.36 1.799E-05 55597 241 493 106 Days at sea 
5 114 4.92 2.183E-06 458029 52 306 985 Trips 
6 2 5.65 4.336E-06 230645 520 088 Trips 
7 112 5.58 3.399E-06 294209 32 898 911 Trips 
8 34 2.56 6.564E-06 152350 5 159 419 Nominal effort units 
9 3 041 0.13 1.150E-05 86989 264 575 358 Nominal effort units 
10 425 12.47 1.506E-05 66412 28 206 428 Trips 
11 34 898 2.47 2.059E-02 49 1 694 860 Nominal effort units 
12 364 3.13 1.154E-04 8663 3 153 225 Nominal effort units 
13 11 6.48 2.206E-06 453226 5 114 282 Hook-hours 
14 11 938 0.21 2.582E-04 3874 46 243 547 Nominal effort units 
15 19 388 1.96 1.073E-04 9322 180 731 647 Nominal effort units 
16 1 333 4.74 8.501E-05 11763 15 684 602 Days at sea 
17 691 0.25 7.776E-03 129 88 872 Fishing days 
18 89 153 0.33 1.788E-04 5593 498 676 489 Nominal effort units 
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Table 3. Unfished ("0"), maximum sustainable yield (MSY) and collapse (clpse) reference points* 
 Reference Biomasses (B), Harvests (H), and Efforts (E) Collapse relative to reference points 
ID B0 (mt) Bmsy (mt) Hmsy (mt) EMSY Bclpse (mt) Eclpse Bclpse/B0 Bclpse/ 
Bmsy 
Hclse/ Hmax
1
 Hclpse/ 
Hmsy 
1 3321701 1665105 280587 2282 817296 3439 0.25 0.49 0.06 0.74 
2 15604 9559 7708 377 4734 468 0.30 0.50 0.30 0.61 
3 7447 1529 651 3246 764 6057 0.10 0.50 0.08 0.93 
4 174716 39318 8839 12499 19472 22919 0.11 0.50 0.05 0.91 
5 111191 26061 12414 218179 12758 411985 0.11 0.49 0.10 0.92 
6 1049 230 61 61385 113 113081 0.11 0.49 0.05 0.90 
7 41221 14734 2218 44288 7189 72961 0.17 0.49 0.04 0.80 
8 20170 4309 2622 92713 2268 152350 0.11 0.53 0.11 0.87 
9 20753749 4699084 2727943 50500 2560375 86989 0.12 0.54 0.12 0.94 
10 19005 4579 3091 44825 2977 66412 0.16 0.65
2
 0.16 0.96 
11 4924 1712 58 2 847 3 0.17 0.49 0.01 0.82 
12 7180 2520 437 1503 1237 2493 0.17 0.49 0.05 0.81 
13 7610 1974 410 94237 974 168707 0.13 0.49 0.05 0.88 
14 2319808 547078 124386 881 271938 1634 0.12 0.50 0.05 0.92 
15 926261 230776 94359 3811 113277 6793 0.12 0.49 0.09 0.87 
16 33240 8267 1479 2104 4101 3841 0.12 0.50 0.04 0.91 
17 1192 580 508 113 498 129 0.42 0.86
2
 0.42 0.98 
18 8445213 3827747 210349 307 1871072 476 0.22 0.49 0.02 0.76 
     Mean 0.17 0.53 0.10 0.86 
     Standard deviation 0.08 0.09 0.10 0.09 
* For hypothetical fisheries, and metrics for the collapsed state relative to reference points.  
1. Hmax is the maximum possible annual catch in the history of a fishery, calculated as described in Methods. 
2 For these two fisheries the maximum possible fishing effort (1/q) still results in a stock > 50% Bmsy the next year, due to annual recruitment or growth of sub-legal 
size classes. The ―collapsed‖ state is defined by the equilibrium stock biomass under maximum effort, rather than the 50% Bmsy criterion.
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Economic model 
We model the economic value of fishery harvest assuming a constant price per 
kilogram of harvested fish, p, and a constant cost per unit of effort applied to harvest those 
fish, c. The first component of the economic model is the annual net profit equation: 
 
 
where πt denotes net profit in year t, Hi,t is the harvest of size class i in year t (in metric 
Tonnes), and Ei,t is effort directed at size class i in year t. Net profit is thus the difference 
between gross revenues and costs. Hi,t is determined from the stock-harvest model defined 
for each hypothetical fishery (Annex). The factor of 1/3 arises because we express 
variable costs in terms of unselective effort (equal on all size classes), but the model uses 
size-specific efforts. We assume that cost structure is constant (the fleet is not dynamic) 
and price structure is constant (the market is not dynamic; fishermen are ―price takers‖ 
with respect to a fixed, constant, market price). 
Net profit in one year does not fully quantify the economic value of the fishery in that 
year because it fails to account for expected future profits, reduced by a discount rate 
reflecting how much one would prefer to have the money now versus later. This more 
complete valuation, or net present value (NPV), is calculated at time t=0 by summing the 
profit function from the present time (t=0) over some specified time horizon (t=), 
discounting future profits at rate r: 
 
 
In our value analyses, we use a low discount rate of 1%, consistent with the inter-
generational social goal of rebuilding (Larkin et al, 2000). We also explored the sensitivity 
of our results to higher discount rates (3% and 7%). To demonstrate how quickly the long-
term benefits of rebuilding accrue, we report the time series of annual profits adding up to 
produce NPV. Because time horizons vary from fishery to fishery depending on the 
amount of time it takes for rebuilding and collapse to occur, all NPV calculations are 
reported in annualised form that is independent of time span (equivalent annuity value, 
Adda and Cooper 2003). Annualised NPV is calculated using the equation:  
r
NPV
NPVAnnualized
/]r)(1-[1
  
-
  
Definition of rebuilding 
A key feature of our analysis is calculating the value of rebuilding a collapsed fishery. 
There are many possible definitions of ―rebuilding‖ a fish stock, reflected in a wide 
variety of real-world rebuilding policies and criteria (e.g. Sumaila and Suatoni 2005). Here 
we chose a rebuilding definition that is based on the long-run equilibrium stock biomass 
under an economically optimal fishing policy. As can be seen from the example in 
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Figure 1, the economically optimal (i.e. maximum net present value) policy will always 
occur at a lower level of fishing effort, and result in a higher equilibrium stock biomass, 
than the maximum biological yield. Thus, our definition of rebuilding in terms of the 
economic optimum meets or exceeds most operational definitions of rebuilding, which are 
frequently based on the stock biomass that maximises biological yield.   
To determine the optimum economic policy, we use a numerical method, Value 
Function Iteration (VFI), to optimise the rebuilding trajectory by maximizing the long-run 
NPV (100y, 1% discount rate) of each hypothetical fishery, given the stock, harvest, and 
economic model parameters. At this low discount rate and long time horizon, rebuilding 
from collapse was the optimal (i.e. profit-maximizing) decision for all of our hypothetical 
fisheries. At higher discount rates and shorter time horizons, rebuilding does not maximise 
net present value for the slowest-growing and latest-maturing species, an issue that has 
been explored elsewhere in more detail (Larkin et al. 2000) and is demonstrated by our 
discount rate sensitivity analysis. The optimal policy function calculated by VFI can be 
used to forward-simulate stock dynamics from different initial conditions under 
economically optimal harvest, allowing assessment of the dynamics of rebuilding. The 
economically optimal policy function assumes that effort on small, medium, and large size 
classes can be independently controlled (―size targeting‖), and is calculated on a 7x8x9 
(504 cell) grid of stock biomasses in the three size classes. This grid size was found to be 
sufficient to capture differences in value among fisheries for purposes of our analysis, 
although in some cases a finer grid may be desirable for precise numerical characterisation 
of optimal policy trajectories for management purposes. The ―rebuilt‖ state is defined as 
the stock biomass at equilibrium under the optimum economic fishing policy. Under this 
definition, the target stock biomass for rebuilding can vary based on both economic (cost, 
price) and biological characteristics of the fishery. The rebuilding goal is defined as 
following an economically optimal trajectory to the economically optimal long-run 
equilibrium. In real-world applications, it may be useful (and is straightforward to 
implement in the VFI optimisation framework) to consider other constraints on the 
rebuilding target, such as conservation and ecosystem goals. 
Scenario description 
We explore two sets of scenarios for each of the 18 hypothetical species. Each 
scenario is generated by starting at a particular state (collapsed or rebuilt, as defined 
above), and simulating the annual stock, harvest, and net profit using the bioeconomic 
model. Net present values are calculated over the scenario time horizons, using a discount 
rate of 1%. The first scenario set compares the net present value of maintaining a fishery 
in a collapsed state (V0) to rebuilding from collapse (V1; Figure 2). This allows 
estimation of the economic value of rebuilding from collapse (V1-V0), and the relative 
value of rebuilding compared to collapse (V1-V0)/V0, or rebuilding value response ratio. 
We also explore how these results change if the discount rate is 3% or 7%. 
14 – THE ECONOMIC VALUE OF REBUILDING FISHERIES 
 
 
OECD FOOD, AGRICULTURE AND FISHERIES WORKING PAPER N°55 © OECD 2012 
Figure 2. Scenario description for rebuilding fisheries 
 
Note: Calculation of the value of rebuilding from collapse. Dynamics of stock biomass (top 
panel), catch (center panel), and net profit (bottom panel) are illustrated for two scenarios, 
V0 and V1opt. In scenario V1opt (solid black lines), the fishery is rebuilt from an initial 
collapsed state by fishing according to the optimal economic policy, as defined in Methods. 
In scenario V0 (dashed red lines), the fishery is harvested such that it remains in a constant 
collapsed state over the same time frame. The value of rebuilding from collapse is 
calculated as the net present value (NPV) of profit generated under scenario V1opt minus 
that generated under scenario V0. NPV is evaluated at time 0 and considers all profit 
generated over the illustrated time period 
Three ways of reaching a ―rebuilt‖ state from a ―collapsed‖ state are considered: 
―optimal‖ (V1opt), and two suboptimal scenarios, ―fast‖ (V1fast) and ―slow‖ (V1slow). In 
all three, the fishery begins in the collapsed state. In the optimal scenario, the fishery is 
rebuilt by fishing according to the economic optimum policy until the stock biomass 
exceeds 99% of the rebuilt state. In the fast scenario, the fishery is closed (i.e. effort=0) 
until the stock biomass exceeds 99% of the rebuilt state, and thereafter fishing proceeds 
according to the optimal policy. In the slow scenario, fishing effort exceeds the optimal 
policy by 20% for the time period it would have taken to rebuild, preventing the 
rebuilding threshold from being reached in the same time as it would have been under 
V1opt; the policy then reverts to the optimum until the biomass is within 99% of the 
rebuilt threshold. Values of all scenarios in this scenario set (V0, V1opt, V1fast, and 
 
0.5
0.6
0.7
0.8
0.9
B
io
m
a
s
s
/B
M
S
Y
0
0.1
0.2
0.3
C
a
tc
h
/B
M
S
Y
0 2 4 6
0
1
2
3
Time (y)
A
n
n
u
a
l 
N
e
t 
P
ro
fi
t 
(r
e
la
ti
v
e
to
 V
0
)
THE ECONOMIC VALUE OF REBUILDING FISHERIES– 15 
 
OECD FOOD, AGRICULTURE AND FISHERIES WORKING PAPER N°55 © OECD 2012 
V1slow) are calculated over the time horizon defined by the slowest rebuilding time 
(V1slow). 
The second scenario set compares the value of collapsing a fishery and then rebuilding 
it (V2), to the value of maintaining it in a rebuilt state without collapse (V3; Figure 7). 
This allows estimation of the dollar value of avoiding collapse in the first place (V3-V2), 
and the relative value of fishing optimally without collapse, compared to collapsing and 
rebuilding (V3-V2)/V2. In both V2 and V3, the fishery begins in the rebuilt state. In V2, 
the fishery is collapsed by fishing according to the collapse effort policy until the stock 
biomass is within 1% of the collapsed state, and then allowed to return within 1% of the 
rebuilt state by fishing according to the optimal policy. To calculate V3, the fishery is 
exploited according to the optimal policy for the entire planning horizon. Values of the 
two scenarios are calculated over the time horizon it takes to collapse and then rebuild the 
fishery in scenario V2. Table 4 summarises the different net present value scenarios we 
calculated. 
Table 4. Definitions and characteristics of the net present value scenarios  
used in the analyses 
NPV 
scenario 
Definition Effort 
Initial  
stock 
Time  
horizon 
V0 NPV of maintaining 
fishery in collapsed 
state 
Effort to maintain collapse Collapsed  Time to recover stock 
using rebuilding 
scenario in V1slow 
V1slow NPV of rebuilding 
fishery using “slow” 
recovery trajectory 
20% higher effort than 
economically optimal effort 
Collapsed Time until recovery 
V1opt NPV of rebuilding 
fishery using 
economically optimal 
rebuilding trajectory 
Calculated as dynamical 
economic optimum 
Collapsed Time to recover stock 
using rebuilding 
scenario in V1slow 
V1fast NPV of rebuilding 
fishery using “fast” 
recovery trajectory  
Zero until recovery is reached. Collapsed Time to recover stock 
using rebuilding 
scenario in V1slow 
V2 NPV of collapsing, 
then recovering fishery 
Effort to maintain collapse, 
then recover according to 
economic optimum 
Economic 
optimum 
Time to collapse and 
recover stock. 
V3 NPV of optimally 
managing fishery 
Defined as economically 
optimal effort policy 
Economic 
optimum 
Time to collapse and 
recover stock, as in 
scenario V2 
Regression analyses 
A second goal of this analysis was to explore the bioeconomic features of a fishery 
that lead to large (or small) values of rebuilding. We conducted exploratory analysis of the 
relationship between biological features of fisheries and two response variables: 
rebuilding time and the relative value of rebuilding (measured as the log rebuilding 
response ratio). We used a stepwise multiple linear regression procedure (Sokal and Rohlf 
1994) to screen a panel of biological metrics (Annex Tables A6 and A7) for relationships 
to rebuilding time or value. The stepwise procedure in JMP 8.0 (SAS Institute, Inc.) was 
used with a probability to enter the model of 0.1 and a probability to leave of 0.25. We 
then constructed preliminary joint models including all identified regressions, and 
successively eliminated effects that were not significant at an alpha=0.05 level in post-hoc 
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t-tests of effect magnitude, resulting in final regression models (Table 6). Although p-
values of effect tests were not corrected for multiple testing, those that were significant 
after applying a sequential Bonferroni procedure (Rice 1989) are indicated in the table. 
We excluded fishery N°17 as an outlier from these analyses because it has an 
exceptionally low relative value of rebuilding; with the maximum possible fishing effort, 
the equilibrium biomass for this fishery was still well above the criterion for collapse 
(Bclpse/Bmsy = 0.86, Table 3). However, final qualitative regression results were not 
changed by including this outlier. All regression analyses were carried out using JMP 8.0 
statistical software (SAS Institute).   
Results and discussion 
Value of recovery 
The value of rebuilding a fishery from a collapsed state, (V1-V0), is positive for all 
18 hypothetical fisheries that we examined when an economically optimal rebuilding 
strategy is employed (Figure 3; Table 5). Even the two suboptimal rebuilding strategies 
that we examined yielded positive values of rebuilding with only one exception (Table 5). 
Value increases (V1-V0) ranged from almost USD 3,000 to over USD 200 million in net 
present value, depending on the fishery. It is important to note that positive rebuilding 
values require adequate time for recovery. If we were to examine shorter time horizons, 
rebuilding strategies would not always result in a net economic benefit relative to 
maintaining high harvest levels, arguing for the merging of short- and long- term 
perspectives in fisheries management. Furthermore, the rebuilt state in terms of stock 
biomass (B/Bmsy) is defined by the economically optimal policy rather than by an 
externally specified biological reference point and therefore is different for each fishery. 
For all of our hypothetical fisheries, stock biomass in the rebuilt state exceeded the 
common Bmsy biological reference point (Table 5), indicating that economically optimal 
rebuilding policies may also help to advance conservation and ecosystem-based 
management goals. 
Absolute values of a recovered fishery (V1) or of a recovered compared to collapsed 
fishery (V1-V0) are dependent o . n the scale of the fishery, and thus are not particularly 
useful metrics for comparing across species. Relative values of rebuilding ([V1-V0]/V0), 
or rebuilding value response ratios, demonstrate the value of rebuilding fisheries across a 
wide range of fishery caricatures (Table 5). For the 18 hypothetical fisheries examined 
here, we found a 580% increase in value resulting from rebuilding the stock from a 
collapsed state using an economically optimal strategy. Removing an outlier with a 
particularly high relative rebuilding value, subtropical shrimp, still yields a relative 
increase in value of 255%, emphasizing the long-term benefits of rebuilding collapsed 
stocks.  
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Figure 3. Value of rebuilding for 18 hypothetical fisheries 
 
Note: Top panel: annualised net present value of optimal rebuilding from collapse (V1
opt
-V0; NPV, 2008 US 
dollars). Center panel: percent increase in value under optimal rebuilding policy compared to fast rebuilding 
policy (100%*[V1
opt
-V1
fast
]/V1
fast
). Bottom panel: percent increase in value under optimal rebuilding policy 
compared to slow rebuilding policy (100%*[V1
opt
-V1
slow
]/V1
slow
). 
If we are to compare an economically optimal rebuilding scenario to either a more 
aggressive rebuilding scenario ("fast" rebuilding, in which the fishery is closed until the 
stock biomass exceeds the rebuilding threshold and then uses the optimal policy) or a less 
aggressive scenario ("slow" rebuilding, in which harvest levels are 20% higher than the 
optimal policy during the period of optimal rebuilding and then switch to the optimal 
policy), we can see the value added of the economically optimal recovery approach 
(Figure 3). The optimal rebuilding strategy has on average a 23% greater value added of 
rebuilding than the fast strategy, and a 3% greater value added than the slow strategy. Of 
course, there are tradeoffs among long-term economic return, short-term harvest or profits, 
and the biological goals of rebuilding (recovery of stock biomass), and alternate rebuilding 
tactics perform differently along these dimensions. Stock recovery can be achieved more 
quickly by using the ―fast‖ scenario, but the long-term economic cost of lost value relative 
to the optimal approach can be quite high. Similarly, continuing to harvest at a level  
 
 
18 – THE ECONOMIC VALUE OF REBUILDING FISHERIES 
 
 
OECD FOOD, AGRICULTURE AND FISHERIES WORKING PAPER N°55 © OECD 2012 
Table 5. Values of rebuilding from collapse (V1) relative to maintaining a collapsed state (V0), rebuilding times, and rebuilding biomass,  
for optimal (opt), fast and slow rebuilding scenarios 
 Annualised Net Present Values (2008 US$) 
Rebuilding response 
ratios 
Rebuilding time   (years) Rebuilding 
biomass 
(B/Bmsy) ID V0 V1opt-V0 V1fast-V0 V1slow-V0 (V1-V0)/ V0 ln([V1-
V0]/V0) 
Opt Fast Slow 
1 38 704 717 64 236 417 41 953 382 64 024 926 1.66 0.51 8 7 9 1.00 
2 390 746 23 908 315 17 283 197 23 262 145 61.19 4.11 4 2 4 1.02 
3 997 437 1 779 450 1 655 280 1 787 564 1.78 0.58 5 3 5 1.20 
4 23 942 863 96 498 802 92 620 999 94 382 464 4.03 1.39 15 5 16 1.26 
5 9 561 258 37 305 600 29 508 191 36 125 897 3.90 1.36 6 3 7 1.13 
6 58 486 130 513 117 489 124 295 2.23 0.80 10 4 10 1.20 
7 1 811 839 2 887 293 1 655 837 2 835 464 1.59 0.47 8 7 8 1.15 
8 650 188 2 525 534 2 307 504 2 523 360 3.88 1.36 8 4 8 1.92 
9 56 999 438 228 427 325 182 697 544 218 225 939 4.01 1.39 7 2 7 1.01 
10 8 999 896 24 601 720 18 257 258 23 564 629 2.73 1.01 6 2 6 1.29 
11 22 693 17 083 13 008 17 539 0.75 -0.28 26 19 29 1.00 
12 208 256 600 906 578 502 573 331 2.89 1.06 22 6 29 1.08 
13 448 823 1 580 493 1 453 304 1 576 237 3.52 1.26 17 6 18 1.46 
14 4 783 181 5 652 499 3 758 293 5 387 656 1.18 0.17 5 4 6 1.13 
15 30 219 020 134 928 576 128 858 557 133 814 943 4.47 1.50 19 3 28 1.00 
16 1 242 409 2 815 289 2 811 990 2 688 903 2.27 0.82 12 4 18 1.00 
17 36 050 2 883 -6 625 2 792 0.08 -2.53 4 4 5 1.33 
18 9 653 670 22 282 116 20 010 048 22 223 329 2.31 0.84 24 14 25 1.06 
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higher than the optimal, the ―slow‖ scenario, also has drawbacks, delaying rebuilding 
action and reducing long-term economic value. It is important to note that these are but 
three strategies for recovering a collapsed stock. There are other potential approaches, and 
the most feasible approach will depend not only on the stated goals of the rebuilding plan, 
but also the management tools available for effectively reducing exploitation rates. 
Designing an appropriate rebuilding policy requires a careful balancing of conservation 
and fisheries goals over the short- and long-term. 
Changes in the size (or age) distribution of the stock are a critical part of rebuilding, 
and thus size selectivity of fishing effort should be an important consideration in 
rebuilding strategies.  However, the degree to which size targeting can be achieved with 
existing technologies is often limited in some fisheries. The optimal rebuilding policies 
calculated by our method assume that effort can be targeted on small, medium, and large 
size classes (although only biomass that exceeds the minimum size at vulnerability will be 
catchable). This coarse size-targeting is intended to be broadly representative of 
reasonably achievable size selectivities in most fisheries, although the ability to control 
size targeting in particular fisheries will obviously be case-dependent. Table 6 shows size 
targeting of effort (exploitation rate), size structure of catch, and size structure of the stock 
relative to its pristine state in the long-run equilibrium of the economic optimum policy 
(i.e. the rebuilt state).   
We can also use our analysis of the value of recovery from collapse to examine 
sources of value increase, and specifically to assess what characteristics of a fishery are 
related to a higher relative value from rebuilding. The 18 hypothetical species have a 
broad range of ecological and life history characteristics, allowing us to examine 
correlations between population parameters and the value of recovery through a regression 
analysis approach. Given that many of these parameters are highly correlated with each 
other and our relatively small species sample size, this analysis cannot provide a rigorous 
explanatory model (Sokal and Rohlf 1994), but is a useful exploratory approach that can 
help to identify some of the primary biological features that are related to the value of 
recovery. We first examined biological parameters that are correlated with optimal 
rebuilding time (Table 7a). We found that two main parameters can help to predict 
rebuilding time. The longer it takes a species to reach the legal or vulnerable size, the 
longer the rebuilding time, which makes intuitive sense, as slow growing species will be 
slower to recover. Second, we found that stocks with a steeper stock-recruitment 
relationship are correlated with faster rebuilding times, an unsurprising result given that 
this steepness parameter essentially measures, in recruitment terms, a stock’s ability to 
recover from very low levels. Finally, reproductive length as a fraction of maximum 
length was a marginally significant parameter, possibly indicating a tendency of faster 
rebuilding times for species that grow quickly to a smaller size and thus are able to devote 
more energy in reproduction relative to growth. 
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Table 6. Size targeting at equilibrium under the optimal economic rebuilding policy, V1opt. 
ID 
Effort Catch Biomass 
Equilibrium exploitation rate 
(% vulnerable biomass caught) 
Equilibrium size structure of catch  
(% of total catch by weight) 
Equilibrium size structure of stock biomass (% 
of unfished by weight) 
Small Medium Large Small Medium Large Small Medium Large 
1 0% 25% 0% 0% 100% 0% 58% 54% 40% 
2 100% 0% 41% 88% 0% 12% 94% 35% 33% 
3 0% 29% 39% 0% 75% 25% 100% 46% 6% 
4 0% 0% 50% 0% 0% 100% 99% 99% 17% 
5 0% 100% 0% 0% 100% 0% 100% 47% 0% 
6 0% 4% 74% 0% 9% 91% 92% 86% 11% 
7 0% 0% 22% 0% 0% 100% 76% 76% 34% 
8 0% 0% 63% 0% 0% 100% 98% 98% 26% 
9 0% 100% 0% 0% 100% 0% 100% 52% 0% 
10 0% 100% 0% 0% 100% 0% 100% 60% 0% 
11 0% 3% 6% 0% 35% 65% 72% 56% 23% 
12 0% 0% 58% 0% 0% 100% 73% 73% 19% 
13 0% 0% 44% 0% 0% 100% 95% 95% 21% 
14 17% 20% 48% 14% 44% 41% 76% 45% 11% 
15 0% 66% 35% 0% 93% 7% 94% 37% 6% 
16 7% 26% 51% 5% 56% 39% 84% 48% 8% 
17 0% 72% 50% 0% 51% 49% 80% 79% 57% 
18 0% 0% 17% 0% 0% 100% 60% 60% 38% 
THE ECONOMIC VALUE OF REBUILDING FISHERIES– 21 
 
OECD FOOD, AGRICULTURE AND FISHERIES WORKING PAPER N°55 © OECD 2012 
Table 7. Results of final multiple linear regression of model results on biological features of fisheries
1
 
Term
2
 Estimate Std Error t Ratio Prob>|t| Signif.
3
 
a) Optimal rebuilding time (whole model: R2=0.66, R2adj=0.58, N=17, p=0.0022) 
Time to reach legal or vulnerable length 1.558 0.456 3.418 0.00458 * 
Steepness (h) of the Beverton-Holt stock-recruitment 
function 
-16.437 5.254 -3.128 0.00800 * 
Length at reproductive maturity as a fraction of 
asymptotic maximum length 
-16.773 7.819 -2.145 0.05141  
b) Log (Rebuilding value response ratio) (whole model: R2=0.71, R2adj=0.67, N=17, p=0.0002) 
Intrinsic growth rate of medium to large biomass 1.524 0.286 5.322 0.00011 * 
Steepness (h) of the Beverton-Holt stock-recruitment 
function 
1.413 0.569 2.485 0.02622 * 
Note: Responses were (a) optimal rebuilding time, and (b) relative value of rebuilding. Final models were selected by a stepwise 
procedure described in Methods. Intercepts were included in models but are omitted from this table. 
1. Regression excluded Species #17, which was an outlier, in part because of its non-standard definition of collapse (see Table 
3 and Methods). 
2. Regressors are sorted in ascending order of p-values. 
3. Effects for which p-values were significant at alpha=0.05 after a sequential Bonferroni procedure to correct for multiple testing 
(Rice 1989) are indicated by an asterisk. 
We also examined how biological parameters of the fisheries were related to relative 
rebuilding value (Table 7b). Species with a higher growth rate in terms of biomass have a 
higher relative value of recovery in the regression model, matching typical expectations 
that faster growing species can recover more quickly and thus reach higher yields faster. 
The steepness of the stock recruitment function is positively related to rebuilding value, 
matching results from the first regression analysis. Viewed collectively, the results of the 
regression models provide a starting point for formulating testable hypotheses of the 
mechanisms underlying the temporal patterns and value of stock recovery and for building 
a framework for customizing rebuilding plans to species characteristics.  
Although the regression analyses found that much of the variability in rebuilding times 
and values are correlated with biological characteristics of the fisheries, the rebuilding 
values and times do not arise simply from the biological characteristics of those species. 
Fishery regulations (minimum size at vulnerability), harvest parameters (catchability), and 
economics (costs, prices) interact with (and are confounded with) the biological features 
of the fishery to determine the nature and value of the optimal rebuilding policy. The 
regulatory choice of minimum size at vulnerability is a good example. Since collapse of 
the fishery is defined relative to vulnerable stock biomass, a very conservative (high) size 
limit would generally make collapse easier to reach, and easier to recover from, than if the 
same species were fished with a lower size limit in place. Thus, one must take into 
account all features of the hypothetical fisheries, rather than simply biological 
characteristics, in determining if they may apply to any particular fishery.   
Dynamics of recovery 
The economic returns from rebuilding for the 18 fisheries examined here are achieved 
over a broad range of time frames. Under an optimal rebuilding strategy, stock recovery 
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requires between 4 and 26 years (with a mean of 11 years), depending on the fishery 
(Figure 4). The slowest species to recover is a temperate rockfish, with subtropical shrimp 
and clams recovering faster than the other species. These results can help guide 
expectations for the time course of recovery and economic benefits. When we examine the 
trajectories of recovery, focusing on temporal patterns in stock biomass and catch and 
comparing optimal, fast and slow rebuilding strategies, we find a broad range of dynamics 
across species and rebuilding tactics (Figures 5.1-18). Predicting rebuilding trajectories for 
specific fisheries will require parameterizing a model like this to the characteristics of 
individual fisheries, but the patterns we document for these 18 fishery caricatures provide 
a starting point for understanding how different types of species are likely to respond to 
rebuilding plans and for characterizing the dynamics of the three rebuilding strategies. For 
the latter, we find that for the slow rebuilding strategy, there is commonly a minimal effect 
on biomass and catch relative to the optimal strategy, despite the reduction in value. In 
other words, fishing substantially harder may have a relatively low benefit for yields while 
reducing the economic value of the fishery and slowing the recovery rate relative to the 
optimum because increased fishing effort is more expensive and reduces the dynamic 
productivity of the resource. Examining the fast rebuilding strategy, in which the fishery is 
closed until it recovers, we find that stock biomass can reach substantially higher levels 
over the short-term, which is some cases may represent a higher priority than economic 
value, but this approach does come at an economic cost as well as possibly social costs of 
lost fishing opportunities. 
Figure 4. Time to rebuild from collapse under optimal rebuilding policy (V1
opt
)  
for 18 hypothetical fisheries 
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Figures 5.1 to 5.6. Simulated rebuilding dynamics for hypothetical fisheries  
 
Notes: For: a) stock biomass relative to vulnerable biomass at MSY (BMSY) and b) catch biomass relative to BMSY. Solid lines 
show results for the three rebuilding scenarios considered: “optimal” (V1
opt
, black with o’s), “fast” (V1
fast
, magenta with x’s), and 
“slow” (V1
slow
, blue with squares). Dashed red lines show the collapse scenario (V0). 
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Figures 5.7 to 5.12. Simulated rebuilding dynamics for hypothetical fisheries 
 
Notes: Lines and symbols as in Figure 5.1. 
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Figures 5.13 to 5.18. Simulated rebuilding dynamics for hypothetical fisheries 
 
Note: Lines and symbols as in Figure 5.1. 
0 5 10 15
0.5
1
1.5
B
io
m
a
s
s
/B
M
S
Y
13. Warm Temperate Snapper
0 5 10 15
0
0.2
0.4
0.6
C
a
tc
h
/B
M
S
Y
Time (y)
0 5 10 15 20 25
0.6
0.8
1
1.2
B
io
m
a
s
s
/B
M
S
Y
15. Temperate Monkfish
0 5 10 15 20 25
0
0.2
0.4
0.6
0.8
C
a
tc
h
/B
M
S
Y
Time (y)
0 5 10 15
0.6
0.8
1
B
io
m
a
s
s
/B
M
S
Y
16. Temperate Tilefish
0 5 10 15
0
0.2
0.4
0.6
C
a
tc
h
/B
M
S
Y
Time (y)
0 1 2 3 4 5
1
1.2
1.4
B
io
m
a
s
s
/B
M
S
Y
17. Subtropical Clam
0 1 2 3 4 5
0
0.5
1
C
a
tc
h
/B
M
S
Y
Time (y)
0 5 10 15 20 25
0.6
0.8
1
B
io
m
a
s
s
/B
M
S
Y
18. Temperate Small Pelagic
0 5 10 15 20 25
0
0.1
0.2
C
a
tc
h
/B
M
S
Y
Time (y)
0 1 2 3 4 5 6
0.6
0.8
1
1.2
B
io
m
a
s
s
/B
M
S
Y
14. Cold Temperate Sole
0 1 2 3 4 5 6
0
0.1
0.2
0.3
C
a
tc
h
/B
M
S
Y
Time (y)
26 – THE ECONOMIC VALUE OF REBUILDING FISHERIES 
 
 
OECD FOOD, AGRICULTURE AND FISHERIES WORKING PAPER N°55 © OECD 2012 
We find that in only a small number of the fisheries (subtropical and temperate small 
pelagics, subtropical and warm temperate snappers, temperate rockfish) does the optimum 
policy require a temporary fishery closure as part of the rebuilding plan. These fisheries 
represent two ends of a spectrum in which slow recovery necessitates a closure – very 
slow growing species like rockfish and snapper require a long time for biomass growth to 
rebuild the stock, while small pelagics collapse only under very high fishing mortality and 
thus require considerable population growth to recover. Comparing the optimal rebuilding 
policy to the slow and fast policies demonstrates that the economically optimal strategy 
does not rebuild the fishery as quickly as is possible. Rebuilding goals can include long-
term economic value, biological sustainability, and short-term and long-term fishing 
opportunities. The appropriate rebuilding strategy for a given context will depend on the 
relative importance of these different goals. The optimal policy modeled here suggests one 
potential path to recovery in which both socioeconomic and biological goals are 
addressed, but other strategies may be preferable depending on stated rebuilding priorities. 
However, we argue that the optimal policy is a good starting point for policy discussions 
given the tendency in fisheries management to overlook the long-term dynamic value of 
fisheries. 
Avoiding collapse 
Thus far we have emphasised the long-term economic benefits of rebuilding collapsed 
fish stocks. While many fisheries are collapsed, a large fraction of stocks are not currently 
collapsed. For these, it will be preferable to avoid collapse. There may be significant 
financial costs associated with implementing and enforcing rebuilding plans, in addition to 
social and political opposition to reducing fishing pressure (Arnason et al. 2009). In 
particular, effectively reducing fishing mortality from unsustainable levels requires either 
top-down management or the realignment of incentives. Therefore, in order to achieve 
sustainable fisheries worldwide we must couple approaches that seek to recover collapsed 
stocks with those that attempt to avoid collapse in the first place.  
We examine the value of avoiding collapse by comparing the value of maintaining an 
economically optimal fishery (V3) versus collapsing and then rebuilding a fishery back to 
the optimal state (V2; Figure 6). We find that the value of avoiding collapse is positive for 
all 18 fisheries (Table 8; Figure 7), with the value attributable to avoiding collapse (V3-
V2) ranging from USD 13 000 to approximately USD 150 million in net present value. 
The relative value of avoiding collapse compared to collapsing (and subsequently 
recovering) a fishery from an optimal state is on average a 92% increase, with a range of 
27% to 176% across the 18 fisheries (Table 8). While these values are all positive, we are 
examining a much longer time period compared to the time frames of the first analysis. 
The trajectory of collapsing from an optimal state requires, on average, 32 years for the 
18 hypothetical fisheries, with a couple of fisheries taking over a century to collapse 
(Table 8). In considering these times to collapse, it is important to note that more 
aggressive collapse effort policies than the one defined here would collapse fisheries more 
rapidly. Adding the rebuilding times (Table 5), the full collapse-and-rebuild cycle requires 
an average of 43 years in our set of hypothetical species. Regardless of the time frames, 
these results support the contention that there are greater long-term economic benefits if 
collapse is avoided, compared to allowing intense fishing pressure for a short period and 
then initiating a stock recovery (Figure 7). Given the number of fish stocks worldwide that 
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are collapsed or approaching collapse, this clearly suggests a significant departure from 
business as usual if we are to maximise the value of global fisheries. 
Figure 6. Calculation of the value of avoiding collapse 
 
Note: Dynamics of (a) stock biomass, (b) catch, and (c) net profit are 
illustrated for two scenarios, V2 and V3.  In scenario V2 (solid magenta 
lines), the fishery is collapsed and then rebuilt according to the optimum 
economic policy. In scenario V3 (dashed green lines), the fishery is 
harvested such that it remains in a constant rebuilt state over the same time 
frame. The value of avoiding collapse is calculated as the net present value 
(NPV) of profit generated under scenario V3 minus that generated under 
scenario V2. NPV is evaluated at time 0 and considers all profit generated 
over the illustrated time period. 
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Table 8. Values of avoiding collapse with times to collapse from the optimal economic equilibrium state. 
ID 
V2 
(USD) 
V3-V2 
(USD) 
Avoid collapse 
response ratio 
Log 
(Avoid collapse 
response ratio) 
Time to 
collapse 
(years) 
1 111 204 895 118 052 410 1.06 0.06 31 
2 11 891 306 17 242 254 1.45 0.37 7 
3 2 719 693 2 285 361 0.84 -0.17 8 
4 93 783 307 66 276 687 0.71 -0.35 11 
5 35 742 783 31 779 272 0.89 -0.12 5 
6 150 595 142 567 0.95 -0.05 16 
7 4 401 181 7 728 011 1.76 0.56 39 
8 2 722 456 2 413 161 0.89 -0.12 12 
9 208 504 699 150 299 026 0.72 -0.33 5 
10 26 177 518 16 601 824 0.63 -0.46 4 
11 57 375 59 386 1.04 0.03 178 
12 546 838 465 264 0.85 -0.16 41 
13 1 577 276 1 317 286 0.84 -0.18 19 
14 10 788 992 7 899 962 0.73 -0.31 11 
15 120 219 934 62 328 510 0.52 -0.66 11 
16 3 091 538 2 039 942 0.66 -0.42 17 
17 48 421 12 929 0.27 -1.32 15 
18 25 623 085 43 798 206 1.71 0.54 146 
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Figure 7. Value of avoiding collapse (V3-V2) for 18 hypothetical fisheries 
 
Note: Annualised net present value, 2008 US dollars. 
Sensitivity to economic assumptions 
In order to standardise the parameterisation of costs for our hypothetical species, we 
have assumed that costs equal revenues (zero net profit) at a specified point on the yield 
curve for unselective effort, defined such that zero net profit occurs at an equilibrium 
stock biomass of 40% Bmsy, and considered all costs to be linearly related to effort 
without fixed costs. However, real fisheries will have higher and lower costs per unit 
effort, and some portion of costs may be fixed (independent of effort). Furthermore, 
depending on how flexible and easily reversible capital and labor costs are in a given 
context, fixed costs may or may not exist when the fishery is completely closed. We use 
hypothetical fishery N°1, a temperate small pelagic, to illustrate the effects of different 
cost structures on the value and dynamics of the economically optimal rebuilding policy 
(Figure 8). We examined four different cost scenarios, explained in Table 9. We examine 
two scenarios with no fixed costs but higher or lower per unit effort costs (scenarios A1 
and A2). We then examine two scenarios with lower per unit effort costs but annual fixed 
costs such that the total cost at the zero net profit equilibrium is the same as the base case 
(scenarios B1 and B2); for one case fixed costs are subtracted from the annual net profit 
equation in every year and in the other, fixed costs are only applied when the fishery is 
open.  
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Figure 8. Effects of changing cost structure on economic optimum rebuilding trajectory, illustrated for model 
fishery 1 
 
Note: Cost structure scenarios and relative economic values are described in Table 9.   
A) Effect of increasing or decreasing costs, when no fixed costs exist.   
B) Effect of irreversible fixed costs and fixed costs reversible during closure years.  
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Table 9. Effects of varying cost structure for hypothetical species 1, a temperate small pelagic. 
Cost scenario Scenario Description 
Base case cost per unit effort = $48,596; no fixed costs 
A1 cost per unit effort 50% lower than base case; no fixed costs 
A2 cost per unit effort 50% higher than base case; no fixed costs 
B1 cost per unit effort 10% lower than base case; annual fixed costs USD 17,694,342; fixed costs 
imposed annually regardless of closure
1
 
B2 cost per unit effort 10% lower than base case; annual fixed costs USD 17,694,342; fixed costs 
imposed only in years that fishing occurs
1
 
 Values 
Rebuilding 
times (yrs) 
Economically 
optimal closure 
(yrs)  V0 V1opt V1opt-V0 
Base case USD 38,704,717 USD 102,941,134 USD 64,236,417 8 3 
Change from base case 
A1 218% 21% -97% no change no change 
A2 -218% -8% 119% +1 no change 
B1 -3% -28% -44% no change no change 
B2 -3% -46% -72% +10 +6 
1. Fixed costs are chosen such that they represent 10% of total costs at the zero net profit equilibrium, and cost per unit effort is 
reduced accordingly so that the total cost is the same as the base case. 
Our examination of different cost scenarios for one hypothetical fishery provides some 
insight into how much our overall result would change under different assumptions about 
the magnitude and nature of costs. Decreasing per unit effort costs by 50% results in a 
large increase in value of the fishery at collapse (V0) and a smaller increase in the value of 
the rebuilding trajectory (V1); thus, the net result is a large decrease (97%) in the value of 
rebuilding (V1-V0) (Table 9). For per unit effort costs that are 50% higher, these effects 
reverse in direction; there is a substantial increase (119%) in the value of rebuilding. In 
these two scenarios, the total rebuilding time and the economically optimal closure period 
(3 years) remain unchanged or virtually unchanged (Table 9) and there are no major 
differences in the trajectory of rebuilding (Figure 8a). The addition of fixed costs, despite 
total costs at the zero net profit equilibrium staying constant, does decrease the value of 
rebuilding by 44% to 72% for this fishery, resulting from a slight decrease in value at the 
collapsed state combined with a larger decrease in value of the rebuilding trajectory 
(Table 9). If fixed costs are only realised in years that the fishery is open, it is optimal to 
close the fishery for longer, until the stock biomass recovers to a point where fishing 
revenues can outweigh fishing costs (Figure 8a). Because of discounting, this longer 
closure period makes the value of rebuilding substantially lower than if fixed costs were 
imposed every year or if there were no fixed costs at all (Table 9). In these later two cases, 
it is economically optimal to fish at low levels while the stock recovers.  
Our fixed cost results indicate that we may be over-estimating the value of rebuilding 
for the fisheries in our analysis given that fixed costs are likely to exist for many fisheries. 
They also highlight the importance of a careful consideration of fixed costs when applying 
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this analysis to real fisheries, and in particular, of determining whether fixed costs are 
maintained or eliminated during periods of fishery closure. On the other hand, it could 
also be argued that, fixed costs aside, we are underestimating the value of rebuilding for 
two reasons. First, we have ignored price premiums often realised on larger size fish 
whose relative share in the catch generally increases as the stock biomass increases under 
rebuilding (Table 10). Second, we have only accounted for direct value benefits to 
commercial fisheries. A full economic valuation would also look at indirect use values, 
option value, bequest value, and existence value and would also consider direct value 
benefits to processors and retailers, recreational fisheries, tourism, and other affected 
sectors.  
In addition to examining how cost assumptions influence our results, we also 
examined the sensitivity of our rebuilding results to our discount rate assumption. 1% is a 
very low discount rate that is consistent with a social desire to rebuild collapsed fisheries, 
but this assumption could make rebuilding appear more attractive compared to other 
investments, detracting from more productive social investments and programs. It is also 
unlikely to reflect discount rates that influence decisions of individual fishermen or private 
investors in fishing interests, which are likely to be different under different economic 
incentive structures. For example, Akroyd et al. (1999) found that discount rates declined 
toward the market interest rate in New Zealand fisheries following implementation of an 
ITQ system. For our purposes, the choice of discount rate can affect three important 
characteristics of the rebuilding policy: the relative value of rebuilding compared to 
collapse, the length of time to rebuild, and the biomass threshold for economically optimal 
rebuilding. We explored sensitivity of all of these features of the economic optimum 
policy to the use of higher discount rates (r=3% and r=7%; Table 10). First, we find that at 
higher discount rates, some fisheries are no longer economically optimal to rebuild 
(marked with ―.‖ in Table 10). In fact, it is already well known that in these types of multi-
cohort fishery bioeconomic models, the economically optimal policy switches from a 
sustainable to an unsustainable policy at sufficiently high discount rates, and this switch 
point will vary from species to species, as is the case for our 18 fisheries. Previous work 
suggest that the switch point will generally occur at lower discount rates for species with a 
shallower stock recruitment function and for species that are relatively slow growing (low 
biomass growth rate and/or high natural mortality) (Horwood and Whittle 1986).  
For species for which the economically optimal policy continues to allow for 
rebuilding at these higher discount rates, the details of the effects of discount rate on 
rebuilding times, rebuilding biomass levels, and rebuilding values are complex and 
variable across fisheries, and thus are not amenable to simple characterisation (Table 10). 
This is unsurprising, as the analytic intractability of optimal controls in even relatively 
simple fisheries bioeconomic models is a classic problem in mathematical biology 
(Horwood and Whittle 1986).  However, overall the discount rate sensitivity analysis 
suggests that for many species, a higher discount rate does not have a dramatic effect on 
our results (Table 10). Increasing the discount rate from 1% to 3% results in, on average, a 
3% decrease in the relative value of rebuilding (range: 18% increase to 28% decrease) 
across the 18 fisheries. Increasing the discount rate from 1% to 7% leads to a slightly 
higher average decrease in relative rebuilding value of 17% (range: 34% increase to 80% 
decrease). Excluding the outlier of shrimp, our analysis using a discount rate of 1%  
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Table 10. Effects of discount rate (r) on the relative value, time, and biomass threshold of optimal economic rebuilding (V1opt).
1
 
ID 
(V1opt-V0)/V0 
Change in 
(V1opt-V0)/V0 
Rebuilding  
time 
Rebuilding biomass 
(B/Bmsy) 
r=1% r=3% r=7% ∆(1 to  3%) ∆(1 to 7%) r=1% r=3% r=7% r=1% r=3% r=7% 
1 1.66 . . . . 8 . . 1.00 <1 <1 
2 61.19 60.79 60.01 -1% -2% 4 4 4 1.02 1.02 1.02 
3 1.78 1.78 . 0% . 5 7 . 1.20 1.23 <1 
4 4.03 3.88 3.39 -4% -16% 15 15 11 1.26 1.26 1.05 
5 3.90 4.60 3.57 18% -9% 6 11 7 1.13 1.19 1.11 
6 2.23 1.76 . -21% . 10 6 . 1.20 1.07 <1 
7 1.59 . . . . 8 . . 1.15 <1 <1 
8 3.88 4.22 1.78 9% -54% 8 10 4 1.92 1.95 1.67 
9 4.01 3.95 3.92 -1% -2% 7 7 7 1.01 1.01 1.00 
10 2.73 2.69 2.53 -2% -7% 6 6 6 1.29 1.29 1.31 
11 0.75 . . . . 26 . . 1.00 <1 <1 
12 2.89 . . . . 22 . . 1.08 <1 <1 
13 3.52 3.31 . -6% . 17 17 . 1.46 1.46 <1 
14 1.18 1.24 1.59 5% 34% 5 9 12 1.13 1.85 1.80 
15 4.47 4.39 . -2% . 19 20 . 1.00 1.00 <1 
16 2.27 1.98 . -13% . 12 11 . 1.00 1.05 <1 
17 0.08 0.06 0.02 -28% -80% 4 4 4 1.33 1.33 1.33 
18 2.31 2.28 . -1% . 24 135 . 1.06 1.08 <1 
Mean 2.55
2
 2.78
2
 2.40
2
 -3% -17%       
Stdev 1.28
2
 1.40
2
 1.38
2
 12% 37%       
1. Missing values (.) denote cases in which the economic optimum policy did not result in rebuilding of vulnerable stock biomass to at least the Bmsy threshold, as indicated in the last 
three columns of the table. 
2. Species 2 was excluded from these calculations to limit effect of this species' extremely high rebuilding value. 
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suggested that the average relative rebuilding value would be a 255% increase (relative to 
collapse). The predicted average relative rebuilding value changes only slightly for a 3% 
or 7% discount rate, to 278% or 240%, respectively. Thus, with higher discount rates, 
fewer fisheries will be economically optimal to rebuild, but those that still are good 
candidates for rebuilding efforts will have similarly high predicted proportional value 
increases as was expected under a lower discount rate.  
Conclusion 
What is the value of recovering a fishery from a collapsed state?  Our results suggest 
that the value can be quite large (perhaps 2-5 fold increases or greater in the value of a 
collapsed fishery), but that the value may be strongly dependent on ecological, economic, 
and regulatory characteristics of the fishery. A similar degree of heterogeneity exists in the 
economically optimal rebuilding time for a fishery (typically 8-20 years), which, 
according to our results, typically involves small (though non-zero) increasing harvest 
during the rebuilding trajectory. Furthermore, while a biologically based rebuilding policy 
that does not consider economics will always be the fastest way to achieve rebuilding 
goals, our results show that the economically optimum policy often takes a little longer but 
leads to substantially higher value. Pushing beyond that (fishing harder than the optimum) 
delays recovery further and also compromises value. The results of this report, and in 
particular the modeling and analysis framework employed here, may help inform targeted 
recovery efforts when priorities must be set across a suite of fisheries. 
While our results provide a strong economic argument for either avoiding collapse or 
recovering fisheries that have collapsed, we have not addressed the critical question of 
how to implement an optimal recovery plan given the complex political and 
socioeconomic landscape that exists for most fisheries. There are numerous management 
tools available for reducing exploitation rates, including gear restrictions, closed areas, 
capacity reduction, reductions in total allowable catch, limited access, and dedicated 
access/catch shares. Which tools will work best is likely to be context dependent (Worm 
et al. 2009). However, we would argue that appropriately designed rights based systems 
(catch shares) can better align individual fisher incentives to promote sustainable fisheries. 
In fact, a recent review highlights how catch shares can decrease fishery collapse, enhance 
sustainability, and increase the dynamic stability of several ecological and economic 
performance measures (Costello et al. 2010). For the case of collapsed fisheries, if it is 
economically optimal to rebuild that fishery, rebuilding is expected to arise endogenously 
in a dedicated access fishery. Of course, for high discount rates, it will not always be 
optimal to rebuild.  However, there there is some evidence from the literature that discount 
rates drop under dedicated access management (Akroyd et al. 1999). Furthermore, our 
results indicate that the long-run, low-discount rate economically optimal rebuilding 
threshold would meet most other biological criteria of rebuilding, suggesting that 
rebuilding efforts driven by incentives will often meet the same goals as those imposed by 
regulations.  
Finally, the results of this study rely on assumptions about the magnitude and structure 
of costs and the discount rate. For some species, this may be unimportant, and for others it 
may play a critical role in whether rebuilding efforts are economically optimal, 
particularly slow growing species and those slow to rebuild a spawning stock. Moreover, 
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because our relatively small set of hypothetical species will seldom apply perfectly in any 
particular real-world fishery, a detailed bioeconomic analysis using parameters specific to 
that fishery will always be advisable if important decisions are to be made based on 
estimates of the economically optimal rebuilding policy. Getting better estimates of cost 
parameters and discount rates will be particularly useful given that these parameters are 
often poorly known and yet affect results as shown here. For a detailed bioeconomic 
model of a particular fishery, one would probably want to use a smaller time step and 
better size resolution (or age structured model if appropriate data available to 
parameterise), and solve for economic optimum on a finer grid. This would require a 
significant computational investment, but might be justified given the values. Of course, 
one might also wish to include stochasticity, environmental variability, and spatial 
structure in such a detailed case study, and the addition of these factors might make other 
methods of searching for optimal or near-optimal policies more attractive. 
Simple mathematical formulas for optimal controls are notoriously intractable even for 
relatively simple fisheries bioeconomic models (Horwood and Whittle? 1986). Here, we 
combine numerical solutions to the optimal control problem with parameterisations based 
on a variety of real-world fisheries, and find that patterns emerge with respect to various 
characteristics of the fisheries. This suggests a novel and useful approach to develop 
heuristics that can guide predictions of fishery rebuilding value from basic biological, 
economic, and regulatory features. These heuristics may aid in identifying fisheries 
particularly likely to exhibit high rebuilding value (or high value of avoiding collapse) as 
candidates for detailed dynamic bioeconomic studies in support of fishery management 
decisions. 
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Annex 
Parameterisation of fishery species, harvest conditions, and economic characteristics 
For each hypothetical fishery, we obtained estimates for the following biological traits 
based on literature values for reference species (Table A1): 
 The annual natural mortality rate, M, of fish biomass. 
 The Von Bertalanffy Growth Function (VBGF) describing individual growth in length in 
terms of individual growth-in-length rate, k, asymptotic maximum length, Linf, and 
either an initial age or an initial length (t0 or L0). For discussion of alternative 
formulations of the VBGF for t0 or L0, see Hilborn and Walters (1992). 
 The allometric scaling relationship between fish length L and fish weight W, defined by 
a power law regression of the form L=a*W^b. Parameters a and b are estimated by 
regression on fish length and weight measurements, and widely reported in the 
literature. 
 Length at reproductive maturity (Lrepro) was estimated as the median or typical length 
at which sexual maturity was reached (for the slower-maturing of the two sexes, if 
applicable). 
 Length at legal size or first vulnerability to capture (Llegal) defined the length above 
which fish become vulnerable to capture in the model. When possible, we estimated the 
median or typical legal size from real fisheries representative of the hypothetical species. 
Otherwise, where no legal minimum sizes were defined, we examined selectivity curves 
from real-world fisheries to determine a representative length at which substantial 
capture began. 
Estimates of catchability were obtained from the literature (Table A2) and 
subsequently refined as part of the model fitting procedure. We obtained approximate 
prices (per kg) for US species by searching the US National Marine Fisheries Service 
annual landings database (www.st.nmfs.noaa.gov/st1/commercial/landings/annual-
landings.html) and other sources. Costs per unit effort are seldom reported and can vary 
widely even within a fishery at different times and places. Since our aim was to produce a 
general analysis of the potential value of rebuilding for a range of hypothetical species, 
rather than bioeconomic case studies of particular fisheries, we defined costs using a 
standardised, model-based algorithm. We believe this is a good alternative to basing costs 
on limited and idiosyncratic available data, but the realism of cost assumptions needs to be 
considered in applying our results to any particular fishery.  
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Table A1. Real fisheries used as guidelines for parameterizing hypothetical species 
ID Hypothetical fishery Example fishery 
References 
Von Bertalanffy 
Growth Fxn 
Length-Weight 
Relationship 
Size at 
vulnerabilty 
Size at 
reproductive 
maturity 
1 Subtropical Small Pelagic Pacific sardine, Sea of Cortez, Mexico INAPESCA 2003 INAPESCA 2003 INAPESCA 2003 INAPESCA 2003 
2 Subtropical Shrimp Brown shrimp, Sea of Cortez, Mexico INAPESCA 2005 INAPESCA 2005 INAPESCA 2005 INAPESCA 2005 
3 Subtropical Grouper Gag grouper, United States SEDAR-10 2006 
Bohnsack and 
Harper 1988 
SEDAR-012 2009 SEDAR-10 2006 
4 Cold Temperate Scallop 
Sea scallop, Gulf of Maine and George's 
Bank, United States 
NEFSC 2007 NEFSC 2007 NEFSC 2007 NEFSC 2007 
5 Cold Temperate Flounder Summer flounder, United States NEFSC 2008 NEFSC 2008 NEFSC 2008 Kerns 2006 
6 Subtropical Wrasse Hogfish, United States SEDAR-6 2004 SEDAR-6 2004 SEDAR-6 2004 SEDAR-6 2004 
7 Subtropical Snapper Yellowtail snapper, United States SEDAR-3 2003 SEDAR-3 2003 SEDAR-3 2003 SEDAR-3 2003 
8 Subtropical Jack Greater amberjack, United States SEDAR-9 2006 SEDAR-9 2006 NMFS 2009 
Thompson et al. 
1999 
9 Temperate Hake Pacific hake/whiting, United States Stauffer 1985 Stauffer 1985 Helser et al. 2006 Helser et al. 2006 
10 Tropical/Subtropical Lobster Caribbean spiny lobster, United States SEDAR-8 2005 SEDAR-8 2005 SEDAR-8 2005 SEDAR-8 2005 
11 Temperate Rockfish Blackgill rockfish, United States Helser 2005 Love et al. 1990 Helser 2005 Helser 2005 
12 Subtropical Sparid Red porgy, United States SEDAR-01 2006 SEDAR-01 2006 SEDAR-1 2002 SEDAR-01 2006 
13 Warm Temperate Snapper Red snapper (SE Atl.) , United States SEDAR-15 2008 SEDAR-15 2008 SEDAR-15 2008 SEDAR-15 2008 
14 Cold Temperate Sole Yellowfin sole, United States 
Wilderbuer et al. 
2008 
Wilderbuer et al. 
2008 
Wilderbuer et al. 
2008 
Wilderbuer et al. 
2008 
15 Temperate Monkfish Monkfish, United States NFSC 2007 NFSC 2007 NFSC 2007 NFSC 2007 
16 Temperate Tilefish Golden tilefish (Mid Atl.), United States Vidal 2009 Turner et al. 1983 SDWG 2005 SDWG 2005 
17 Subtropical Clam Chocolate clam, Bahia La Paz, Mexico Rodriguez 2008 Rodriguez 2008 Rodriguez 2008 Rodriguez 2008 
18 Temperate Small Pelagic Atlantic mackerel, United States Pauly 1978 NEFSC 2005 NEFSC 2005 O'Brien 1993 
Note: With references for the biological parameter values reported in Table 1 
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Table A2. Initial values and sources of natural mortality (M) and catchability (q) parameters  
ID M M reference q q reference 
1 0.853  INAPESCA 2003  1.000E-04  INAPESCA 2003  
2 2.32  INAPESCA 2005  7.500E-04  INAPESCA 2005  
3 0.15  SEDAR-10 2006  1.000E-04 n/a1 
4 0.1  NEFSC 2007  3.200E-05  NEFSC 2007  
5 0.225  NEFSC 2007  4.800E-06  NEFSC 2007  
6 0.13025  SEDAR-6 2004  7.000E-06  SEDAR-6 2004  
7 0.2  SEDAR-3 2003  6.000E-06  SEDAR-3 2003  
8 0.25  SEDAR-15 2008  1.000E-05 n/a1 
9 0.23  Stauffer 1985  1.000E-05 n/a1 
10 0.34  SEDAR-8 2005  2.000E-05  SEDAR-8 2005  
11 0.04  Helser 2005  5.000E-02 n/a1 
12 0.225  SEDAR-9 2006  1.000E-04 n/a1 
13 0.1  SEDAR-15 2008  1.600E-06  SEDAR-15 2008  
14 0.12  Wilderbuer et al. 2008  1.000E-04 n/a1 
15 0.25  NFSC 2007  1.000E-04 n/a1 
16 0.1  NEFSC 2005  2.320E-04  NEFSC 2005  
17 1.61  Rodriguez 2008  7.000E-03  Rodriguez 2008  
18 0.2  NEFSC 2005  1.000E-04 n/a1 
Note: used as first guesses in the constrained non-linear least-squares model fitting procedure. 
1. Value of q chosen in conjunction with definition of nominal effort units to agree with estimated fishing mortality.  See fishing 
mortality estimates in reference for catch-effort time series (Table A3). 
Table A3. Sources and characteristics of catch-effort time series  
to which the final biological-harvest model was fit
1
 
ID Year Start Year End Source 
1 1969 1990  INAPESCA 2003  
2 1988 1999  INAPESCA 2005  
3 1962 2004  SEDAR-10 2006  
4 1999 2007  Clifford 2008  
5 1995 2003  NEFSC 2007  
6 1992 2001  SEDAR-6 2004  
7 1985 2001  SEDAR-3 2003  
8 1981 2006  SEDAR-15 2008  
9 1997 2007  Stauffer 1985  
10 1985 2002  SEDAR-8 2005  
11 1995 2004  Helser 2005  
12 1972 2004  SEDAR-9 2006  
13 1993 2006  SEDAR-15 2008  
14 1964 2008  Wilderbuer et al. 2008  
15 1997 2006  NFSC 2007  
16 1979 2004  NEFSC 2005  
17 1992 2004  Rodriguez 2008  
18 1985 2005  NEFSC 2005  
1.
 
The model fitting procedure was used to "tune" the M and q parameters of the biological model, and to fit alpha and beta 
parameters of the Beverton-Holt stock-recruitment function, as described in Methods.
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Stock-harvest model 
To represent the biological dynamics of the hypothetical fish stocks, we defined a size 
structured state-space model. The general features and assumptions of this modeling 
framework are discussed in Hilborn and Walters (1992). Briefly, we use discrete time, 
non-spatial equations to describe changes in the size-structured stock biomass X over time 
as a function of size-structured biomass growth matrix , natural mortality M, harvest H, 
and recruitment R. Here, bold face type is used to indicate vector or matrix variables. In 
this model, the growth matrix is derived from the individual growth-in-length relationship, 
a Von Bertalanffy Growth Function: 
 
combined with the length-weight relationship: 
 
For the purposes of the model described here, all lengths are expressed in centimeters 
(with the length measurement dependent on the type of species, as shown in Table 1) and 
all individual weights in grams whole-body wet weight. (Note, however, that prices are 
defined per kg of fish weight, and stock biomasses and catches are given in metric 
Tonnes). Deriving  from the parameters in Table 1 involves several steps. First, the Von 
Bertalanffy Growth Function (VBGF) is solved for Nage discrete monthly age classes from 
0 to the maximum age and midpoint lengths of each age class are converted to individual 
biomass using the length-weight relationship. An Nage x Nage matrix is then constructed 
with superdiagonal elements equal to the ratio of each age class' midpoint biomass divided 
by the previous age class' midpoint biomass, element (Nage, Nage) equal to 1, and zero 
elements elsewhere. This is the age-structured biomass growth matrix and represents the 
contribution of biomass in age class i at time t to biomass in age class j at time t+1: 
 
Assuming that all individuals recruit at the same time and grow at the same rate, this is 
also the gross biomass growth matrix for the population (neglecting population growth 
due to recruitment, which will be represented separately). This matrix is re-binned by 
integrating under the stable age distribution to produce a 3x3 size-structured matrix at a 
yearly time interval. The result is a biomass growth matrix that enters the final model (for 
a detailed discussion of transition between age-structured and size-structured growth 
matrices, see Hilborn and Walters 1992): 
 
This size-structured matrix represents the contribution of biomass in size class i in 
year t to biomass in size class j in year t+1. We use three size classes, corresponding to 
small, medium, and large individuals (size classes 1, 2, and 3). Size classes were defined 
in a standardised way relative to the individual growth-in-weight curve that arises from the 
combination of VBGF and length-weight relationships. Two lengths defined the transition 
points from small to medium and medium to large size classes, respectively: 
)a(-k)  - L - (LL L ii exp0
 )L(  W ii 
age
ji ,
size
ji ,
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Lmedium = length at [(age at which 95% of asymptotic maximum weight achieved)/3.5] 
Llarge = length at [(age at which 95% of asymptotic maximum weight achieved)/2] 
The equation of state for stock biomass is given by: 
 
 
where H(i,t) is harvest, Rj(S) denotes the Beverton-Holt recruitment function for size class 
j: 
 
 
S is the spawning stock biomass, and F is a vector of weights representing the relative 
contributions of each size class to the spawning stock. Note that recruitment is not 
explicitly represented in the growth transition matrix, but rather by the separate vector 
function Rj(S). The value of X at time t is the vector of biomass in each size class before 
harvest (i.e. at the start of the fishing season). Reproduction and recruitment are assumed 
to occur on average in the middle of the year (though the model is robust to this 
assumption because alpha and beta of the recruitment function are free parameters fit to 
catch-effort data, as described below). Note that density dependence is assumed to enter 
only through the stock-recruitment relationship. Growth and mortality are not density 
dependent. The output of the stock model is X(i,t), the pre-harvest stock biomass in each 
of the three size classes at time t. 
Hi,t is the biomass of size class i harvested in year t, given by the harvest model 
equation: 
 
subject to the constraint  
0)( ,,  titi HX  
The harvest policy is determined by the effort E(i,t) exerted on size class i at time t. 
E(i,t) is treated as an exogenous "control" or input variable, defined by the effort policy 
(equivalently called the harvest policy or fishing policy). The parameter q relates E(i,t) to 
the amount of biomass removed (harvested). The harvest equation assumes that catch 
biomass is linearly related to vulnerable stock biomass for each size class, by a constant 
catchability parameter q. The units of q are biomass caught per unit vulnerable stock 
biomass per unit effort. The output H(i,t) is the biomass of fish caught in size class i at 
time t. Harvest, H(i,t), serves as a link from the stock-harvest model, described above, to 
the economic model, described in the Methods section of this report. The size at first 
vulnerability, Llegal, determines the vector of fractions of each size class that are 
vulnerable to harvest, Vuln. Similarly, the length at reproductive maturity, Lrepro, is used 
to calculate the first element of the reproductive fraction vector F. 
Initial guesses of natural mortality and catchability were taken from the literature, and 
subsequently "tuned" within a narrow range by nonlinear least-squares constrained 
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minimisation fit to catch-effort time series data (using the fmincon routine in the 
Matlab v7.1 R2007b Optimisation Toolbox). Stock-recruitment parameters alpha and beta 
and the unknown initial biomass vector Xinit were also fit to the time series as free 
parameters, constrained only to be positive. Input catch-effort time series were taken from 
real-world fisheries representative of our hypothetical species (Table A3). The unit of 
catch was metric Tonnes (= 1000kg). The objective function for the minimisation 
algorithm was the negative root-mean-squared error of the actual versus predicted total 
catch in the time series. Parameters fit by nonlinear constrained minimisation were q, M, 
A, B, and Xinit (all other parameters were fixed). Initial guesses for q and M are given in 
Table A2. The fitting procedure was allowed to explore values from 25% to 400% of the 
initial guess. Alpha, beta, and Xinit were positive free parameters. Xinit is the vector of 
initial biomasses in each size class for the start of the time series period, and is not 
subsequently used in our analysis. Model fit statistics are given in Table A4 and final 
parameters from the model fitting procedure are given in Table A5. 
Table A4. Statistics of biological-harvest model fit to catch-effort time series  
ID Catch Prediction RMSE (mt) Relative error (RMSE/mean) 
1 8384 8.4% 
2 696 17.9% 
3 45 9.1% 
4 282 4.0% 
5 1185 11.5% 
6 17 11.4% 
7 106 8.6% 
8 153 8.1% 
9 66395 23.2% 
10 394 14.1% 
11 1 0.4% 
12 38 9.2% 
13 10 15.6% 
14 39694 36.8% 
15 1103 4.2% 
16 433 26.5% 
17 68 26.9% 
18 17353 31.5% 
For example fisheries (see Table A3). 
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Table A5. Final values of all parameters of fitted biological-harvest model for the 18 hypothetical species 
ID q M1 M2 M3 
Psi 
(1,1) 
Psi 
(1,2) 
Psi 
(1,3) 
Psi 
(2,2) 
Psi 
(2,3) 
Psi 
(3,3) alpha beta 
Vuln 
(1) 
Vuln 
(2) 
Vuln 
(3) F(1) F(2) F(3) 
1 7.383E-05 0.705 0.853 0.853 0.692 2.176 0.0 0.556 0.682 1.0 2762785 2142910 0.128 1.0 1.0 0.095 1.0 1.0 
2 2.138E-03 2.320 2.109 2.109 0.011 0.957 5.106 0.0 1.524 1.0 38501 58.2 0.631 1.0 1.0 0.077 1.0 1.0 
3 1.311E-04 0.182 0.182 0.182 0.833 0.782 0.0 0.778 0.371 1.0 441 2 0.325 1.0 1.0 0.272 1.0 1.0 
4 1.799E-05 0.121 0.100 0.100 0.692 1.309 0.0 0.556 0.780 1.0 3588 526 0.437 1.0 1.0 0.730 1.0 1.0 
5 2.183E-06 0.186 0.225 0.272 0.750 0.858 0.0 0.667 0.507 1.0 9950 2 0.514 1.0 1.0 0.776 1.0 1.0 
6 4.336E-06 0.130 0.123 0.108 0.80 0.639 0.0 0.667 0.511 1.0 45.3 31.3 0.160 1.0 1.0 0.751 1.0 1.0 
7 3.399E-06 0.199 0.165 0.165 0.50 1.388 0.0 0.333 1.037 1.0 3014 8857 0.190 1.0 1.0 0.672 1.0 1.0 
8 6.564E-06 0.207 0.207 0.207 0.692 1.206 0.0 0.60 0.638 1.0 1471 241 0.0 0.732 1.0 0.065 1.0 1.0 
9 1.150E-05 0.278 0.278 0.278 0.750 1.221 0.0 0.636 0.598 1.0 1900849 77.5 0.317 1.0 1.0 0.142 1.0 1.0 
10 1.506E-05 0.411 0.411 0.340 0.714 1.531 0.0 0.60 0.653 1.0 2650 3.09 0.425 1.0 1.0 0.451 1.0 1.0 
11 2.059E-02 0.048 0.040 0.040 0.952 0.191 0.0 0.935 0.104 1.0 84.9 1013 0.327 1.0 1.0 0.094 1.0 1.0 
12 1.154E-04 0.272 0.186 0.186 0.818 0.627 0.0 0.714 0.420 1.0 1030 1606 0.118 1.0 1.0 0.397 1.0 1.0 
13 2.206E-06 0.100 0.121 0.121 0.80 0.964 0.0 0.714 0.50 1.0 191 196 0.275 1.0 1.0 0.617 1.0 1.0 
14 2.582E-04 0.122 0.120 0.145 0.882 0.728 0.0 0.833 0.289 1.0 69993 28.8 0.566 1.0 1.0 0.0 0.481 1.0 
15 1.073E-04 0.250 0.207 0.250 0.900 1.258 0.0 0.857 0.250 1.0 48983 6712 0.250 1.0 1.0 0.278 1.0 1.0 
16 8.501E-05 0.083 0.100 0.121 0.895 0.668 0.0 0.846 0.274 1.0 698 202 0.466 1.0 1.0 0.368 1.0 1.0 
17 7.776E-03 1.610 1.610 1.331 0.240 9.807 0.0 0.500 1.322 1.0 2889 357 0.0 0.193 1.0 0.0 0.594 1.0 
18 1.788E-04 0.171 0.200 0.242 0.778 0.704 0.0 0.667 0.494 1.0 1492403 7534012 0.572 1.0 1.0 0.384 1.0 1.0 
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Table A6. Biological features (and units) screened for effects on rebuilding time and rebuilding value 
Biological feature Units 
Time to reach 95% of maximum length Years 
Time to reach 99% of maximum length Years 
Time to reach reproductive maturity Years 
Time to reach legal or vulnerable length Years 
Asymptotic maximum weight Kg 
Time to reach 95% of maximum weight Years 
Time to reach 99% of maximum weight Years 
Weight at reproductive maturity kg 
Weight at legal/vulnerable length kg 
Weight at transition from "small" to "medium" size class kg 
Weight at transition from "medium" to "large" size class kg 
Maximum age inferred from natural mortality rate Years 
Maximum age inferred from Von Bertalanffy growth rate Years 
Intrinsic growth rate of biomass at transition from small to medium size Years-1, exponential biomass growth rate 
Intrinsic growth rate of biomass at transition from medium to large size Years-1, exponential biomass growth rate 
Intrinsic growth rate of biomass, averaged over size classes Years-1, exponential biomass growth rate 
Natural annual biomass survivorship fraction, small size class Fraction (annual, biomass) 
Natural annual biomass survivorship fraction, medium size class Fraction (annual, biomass) 
Natural annual biomass survivorship fraction, large size class Fraction (annual, biomass) 
Natural annual biomass mortality rate, averaged over size classes Years-1, exponential biomass loss rate 
Steepness (h) of the Beverton-Holt stock-recruitment function Unitless 
Von Bertalanffy growth rate Years-1, exponential growth rate in length 
Exponent of allometric length-weight relationship Unitless 
Von Bertalanffy asymptotic maximum length Cm 
Median or typical length at reproductive maturity Cm 
Median or typical length at legal size or first vulnerability Cm 
Length at reproductive maturity as a fraction of asymptotic maximum length Unitless 
Length at vulnerability to capture as a fraction of asymptotic maximum length Unitless 
Length at reproductive maturity as a fraction of length at vulnerability to capture Unitless 
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Table A7. Values of biological features of fishery not reported elsewhere (i.e. derived quantities calculated from basic parameters).  
ID 
Time to 
reach 
95% of 
max. 
length 
Time to 
reach 
99% of 
max. 
length 
Time to 
reach 
repro. 
maturity 
Time to 
reach legal 
or vulnerable 
length 
Asymptotic 
maximum 
weight 
Time to 
reach 95% 
of 
maximum 
weight 
Time to 
reach 
99% of 
maximu
m weight 
Weight at 
repro. 
maturity 
Weight at 
legal or 
vulnerable 
length 
Weight at 
transition 
from small to 
medium  
size class 
Weight at 
transition 
from medium 
to large  
size class 
1 7.587 11.822 2.213 1.995 213.926 10.518 14.789 47.335 39.822 3.005 5.259 
2 1.389 2.178 0.497 0.138 158.661 1.910 2.705 53.637 7.744 0.546 0.955 
3 15.343 23.814 3.768 3.409 18944.966 20.941 29.483 3242.417 2714.122 5.983 10.471 
4 7.918 12.209 0.778 1.697 60.341 10.748 15.075 1.328 7.174 3.071 5.374 
5 9.321 14.943 0.632 1.511 3501.685 13.342 19.015 180.900 459.581 3.812 6.671 
6 11.428 18.103 0.973 3.948 1659.575 15.783 22.518 98.045 579.439 4.509 7.892 
7 5.057 8.110 0.568 1.552 768.852 6.938 10.016 96.145 270.715 1.982 3.469 
8 8.285 12.976 2.935 3.781 22479.486 11.248 15.979 7826.727 10614.960 3.214 5.624 
9 10.017 15.382 3.156 2.296 1367.817 13.317 18.723 351.112 197.917 3.805 6.658 
10 8.813 13.546 1.416 1.504 4859.554 11.795 16.569 326.336 372.446 3.370 5.897 
11 52.057 81.866 18.095 12.041 1750.556 72.337 102.411 558.394 309.339 20.668 36.169 
12 12.946 20.611 2.485 4.371 1849.994 17.931 25.660 327.855 651.399 5.123 8.966 
13 11.974 18.411 1.630 3.354 10140.274 16.436 22.932 343.817 1754.280 4.696 8.218 
14 20.858 31.806 11.085 2.700 545.796 28.340 39.384 265.344 11.070 8.097 14.170 
15 24.993 37.604 4.358 4.660 33066.610 33.335 46.054 988.030 1268.908 9.524 16.668 
16 22.893 34.922 4.902 3.964 20789.593 31.588 43.727 1482.663 818.298 9.025 15.794 
17 4.970 7.638 1.562 2.183 113.785 6.851 9.543 23.781 42.344 1.958 3.426 
18 10.097 16.240 2.272 1.465 1130.743 14.416 20.613 239.853 143.834 4.119 7.208 
For units of each quantity, see Table A6. 
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Table A7, continued 
ID 
Max. age 
inferred 
from 
natural 
mortal. 
rate 
Max. age 
inferred 
from 
VBGF 
Intrinsic 
growth 
rate of 
biomass 
at 
transition 
from small 
to medium 
size 
Intrinsic 
growth 
rate of 
biomass 
at 
transition 
from 
medium to 
large size 
Intrinsic 
growth 
rate of 
biomass, 
averaged 
over size 
classes 
Natural 
annual 
biomass 
survivor-
ship 
fraction, 
small 
size 
class 
Natural 
annual 
biomass 
survivor-
ship 
fraction, 
medium 
size 
class 
Natural 
annual 
biomass 
survivor-
ship 
fraction, 
large 
size 
class 
Steepness 
(h) of the 
Beverton-
Holt 
stock-
recruit 
function 
Length at 
repro. 
maturity as 
fraction of 
asymptotic 
max. length 
Length at 
vulner. to 
capture as 
fraction of 
asymptotic 
maximum 
length 
Length at 
repro. 
maturity 
as a 
fraction of 
length at 
vulner. to 
capture 
1 12.343 13.158 0.368 0.588 0.478 0.494 0.426 0.426 0.387 0.615 0.581 1.057 
2 3.228 2.451 4.511 2.040 3.275 0.098 0.121 0.121 0.975 0.692 0.358 1.930 
3 38.609 26.316 0.182 0.251 0.217 0.834 0.834 0.834 0.999 0.549 0.517 1.062 
4 47.443 13.333 0.368 0.588 0.478 0.886 0.905 0.905 0.988 0.273 0.485 0.563 
5 34.435 17.464 0.288 0.405 0.347 0.830 0.799 0.762 1.000 0.398 0.532 0.749 
6 47.526 20.738 0.223 0.405 0.314 0.878 0.884 0.898 0.903 0.378 0.696 0.543 
7 28.966 9.488 0.693 1.099 0.896 0.819 0.848 0.848 0.594 0.468 0.683 0.685 
8 30.231 14.577 0.368 0.511 0.439 0.813 0.813 0.813 0.958 0.687 0.765 0.897 
9 25.147 16.667 0.288 0.452 0.370 0.757 0.757 0.757 1.000 0.608 0.493 1.233 
10 18.393 14.706 0.336 0.511 0.424 0.663 0.663 0.712 0.999 0.382 0.400 0.954 
11 140.809 92.593 0.049 0.067 0.058 0.953 0.961 0.961 0.587 0.687 0.566 1.214 
12 28.094 23.810 0.201 0.336 0.269 0.762 0.830 0.830 0.592 0.550 0.697 0.789 
13 59.445 20.000 0.223 0.336 0.280 0.905 0.886 0.886 0.911 0.336 0.568 0.592 
14 56.143 34.014 0.125 0.182 0.154 0.885 0.887 0.865 1.000 0.790 0.279 2.828 
15 36.144 39.185 0.105 0.154 0.130 0.779 0.813 0.779 0.972 0.304 0.331 0.919 
16 77.414 37.369 0.111 0.167 0.139 0.921 0.905 0.886 0.976 0.445 0.371 1.200 
17 5.588 8.292 1.427 0.693 1.060 0.200 0.200 0.264 0.628 0.610 0.732 0.833 
18 37.471 19.084 0.251 0.405 0.328 0.843 0.819 0.785 0.341 0.612 0.520 1.176 
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The Economic Value of Rebuilding Fisheries: 
 
Addendum 
The following addendum includes additional analysis and discussion regarding some 
key issues that have arisen from in the report, The economic value of rebuilding fisheries 
(hereafter referred to as ―OECD report‖). The key goals and findings of our follow-up 
research include:  
 Representativeness of modeled species: The OECD report presented a bioeconomic 
model to determine the economic value of rebuilding collapsed fisheries and of avoiding 
collapse, examining 18 model fisheries with diverse life history, management, and 
economic characteristics. While our intent was for these fisheries to be broadly 
representative of global fisheries, the example real-world fisheries and data sources that 
guided development of these fisheries were based on a geographically restricted 
selection from the United States and Mexico. In order to evaluate whether our results 
can be generalised to fisheries around the world, we examined how the hypothetical 
fisheries compare to a dramatically larger subset of global commercial fisheries. Using a 
global database of four key life history parameters for commercial marine species, we 
find that the modeled species in the OECD report are largely representative of 
commercial fishery species worldwide.  
 Slow rebuilding strategy: In this addendum, we investigate a more realistic slow 
rebuilding strategy to better understand the economic and biological consequences of 
rebuilding a stock at a slower rate than the economically optimal policy. In the original 
report, we modeled the ―slow‖ rebuilding strategy by multiplying the optimal size-
targeted effort by a factor of 1.2 (i.e. a 20% increase in effort over the optimal policy). 
Modeling the effort increase as a multiplicative function of the optimum policy carries 
the assumptions that optimal size-targeting is perfectly achieved and adopted under the 
slow rebuilding strategy, and that periods identified as closures by the optimum policy 
remain as closures under the slow policy. Given these generous assumptions, the cost of 
choosing a slow rebuilding policy over an optimal policy is relatively small (1.5% of the 
optimum value, on average; Figure 3b). In this addendum, we explore an alternative, 
and more realistic slow rebuilding policy (―new slow‖), where a fraction (20%) of the 
collapse level of fishing effort continues unabated (regardless of closures occurring for 
the optimal policy) during the rebuilding period, without size targeting. This is modeled 
by adding 20% of the collapse effort to the optimal policy function for each size class. 
For this new slow policy, the cost over the optimal policy is much higher (average of 
11.6% of the optimum value; Figure 3c), and is similar to the cost of the fast policy used 
in the OECD report (average 12.6%; Figure 3a). Similar to our previous conclusions, we 
find that rebuilding strategies that are slower than the economically optimal strategy, 
because they allow a higher level of fishing effort to continue during the rebuilding 
THE ECONOMIC VALUE OF REBUILDING FISHERIES– 51 
 
OECD FOOD, AGRICULTURE AND FISHERIES WORKING PAPER N°55 © OECD 2012 
period, result in a decrease in rebuilding value and an increase in rebuilding time. 
Comparing two alternative slow strategies highlights how the magnitude of these 
changes depends on assumptions about the level and size-targeting of fishing effort 
relative to the optimum.  
 Discount rate: We evaluate in more detail the sensitivity of our modeled results to the 
choice of a very low discount rate of 1% and identify how high the discount rate would 
need to be for each fishery in order to change the economically optimal policy to 
commercial collapse of the stock. Specifically, we conducted additional discount rate 
sensitivity analyses, confirming our previous finding that fisheries tend to show similar 
relative rebuilding values at increasing discount rates, until a ―switch point‖ discount 
rate is reached, above which it is no longer economically optimal to rebuild. We 
calculated the switch point, which occurs on average at a discount rate of 6% ± 2.6% 
(mean ± 1SD) for our modeled fisheries. Based on the subset of species in our analysis 
and our new analysis of the discount rate switch point, between 44% and 72% of 
fisheries would be economically optimal to rebuild given a discount rate between 5% 
and 7%, and between 78% and 100% of fisheries would be economically optimal to 
rebuild with discount rates from 2% to 3%. This new analysis makes clear that 
economic policies, financing mechanisms, and/or regulatory changes that reduce 
effective discount rates in fisheries will be a critical part of any broad effort to realise 
economic benefits from rebuilding.  
Representativeness of modelled species 
In our original report to the OECD, we developed a bioeconomic model to determine 
the economic value of rebuilding collapsed fisheries and of avoiding collapse, examining 
18 model fisheries. Our intent was to select a group of fisheries for which data were 
readily available and which also span a spectrum of different life history, management, 
and economic characteristics. If the hypothetical fisheries are representative of a large 
class of global fisheries, our general results identifying the economic benefits of 
rebuilding collapsed fisheries can be extrapolated, with an appropriate degree of caution, 
to any geography or even to global fisheries management policy. However, the example 
real-world fisheries and data sources that guided development of each hypothetical 
fishery are based on a geographically restricted selection from the United States and 
Mexico, shedding doubt on whether our results can be generalised beyond US and 
Mexican fisheries.  
In order to evaluate whether our modeled species are broadly representative of 
fisheries worldwide, we examined how the hypothetical fisheries compare to a 
dramatically larger subset of global commercial fisheries for important life history 
characteristics. We queried the Microsoft Access version of the Fishbase database 
(www.fishbase.org) for all marine species (i.e. all species that spend at least one stage of 
development in saltwater) of commercial importance (i.e. capture fisheries categorised in 
Fishbase as ―highly commercial,‖ ―commercial,‖ and ―minor commercial‖). For each of 
these species, we then queried Fishbase for the following life history parameters: Von 
Bertalanffy asymptotic maximum length (Linf, in cm), Von Bertalanffy growth rate (k, in 
1/y), natural mortality rate (M, in 1/y), and median or typical length at reproductive 
maturity (Lrepro, in cm). When multiple estimates of a parameter were available for a 
single species, we calculated the average across all estimates. The resulting global 
dataset, which includes any species for which estimates of at least one of the four life 
history parameters were available in Fishbase, includes 1024 species; not all parameters 
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were available for each species in the dataset (Table 1). When comparing the parameter 
values for our modeled species to the range of values observed in the global dataset, we 
find that our modeled species mostly fall between the 5th and 95th percentiles for each 
parameter, and never exceed or fall short of the maximum and minimum values, 
respectively, observed for global fisheries (Table 1).
1
  
For the fisheries in the global commercial dataset for which all four parameter values 
were available (n=202 species), we conducted a Principal Components Analysis (PCA) to 
examine the representativeness of our modeled species within the context of all four key 
life history parameters. Lrepro was first converted to a relative value by dividing by Linf 
(i.e. % of maximum length at which the species typically reaches reproductive maturity). 
Data were transformed for normality prior to PCA as follows: Log10(Linf), Log10(k), 
Log10(M), and Log10(1+[Lrepro /Linf]). Transformed variables passed Shapiro-Wilk 
tests for normality. PCA on centered and standardised variables identified two leading 
principal components that explained 85% of the total variance. Principal component 1 
(PC1) was most strongly associated with variation in Linf (positive correlation) and k and 
M (negative correlation). Loadings on PC1 were [Linf, k, M, Lrepro/Linf] = [0.5590, -
0.6031, -0.5598, -0.1019], and 59.3% of the variance was associated with this component. 
Principal component 2 (PC2) was most strongly associated with variation in Lrepro/Linf 
(positive correlation) and to a lesser extent M (negative correlation). Loadings on PC2 
were [Linf, k, M, Lrepro/Linf] = [-0.0357, 0.0016, -0.2151, 0.9759], and 25.3% of the 
variance was associated with this component. The PCA and all related statistical analyses 
were conducted using Matlab R2007b with Statistics Toolbox (The Mathworks, Inc.; 
Natick, MA).  
We plotted PC2 versus PC1 for global marine fisheries, and then transformed and 
plotted our fisheries in this same principal component space (Figure 1a). Qualitatively, 
the subset of fisheries chosen for our modeling analysis appears representative of global 
marine fisheries, without major biases or omissions. We also compared the empirical 
cumulative distribution function (CDF) of our species’ PC1 and PC2 values to the CDF 
of the larger dataset (Figure 1b,c), and used two-tailed Kolmogorov-Smirnov (K-S) tests 
to evaluate evidence that the distributions of our chosen species differed from the global 
dataset. High p-values obtained in a K-S test (p>0.05) indicate that the sample 
distribution is likely to come from the same distribution as the larger dataset. K-S tests of 
PC1 (p=0.18) and PC2 (p=0.61) distributions provided no evidence to reject the null 
hypothesis that our sample subset was drawn from the global distribution. We conclude 
that, qualitatively and quantitatively, the subset of species that we modeled is broadly 
representative of global marine commercial fisheries in terms of basic life history 
parameters (Linf, k, M, and Lrepro).  
If only two of the four life history parameters are examined, we can evaluate the 
representativeness of our modeled fisheries in the context of an even larger set of global 
commercial fisheries. Figure 2 shows a plot of growth rate (k) versus asymptotic 
maximum length (Linf) for the 927 species in the global dataset described above for 
which both of these parameters were available. Again, it is qualitatively apparent that our 
modeled species are representative of growth model parameters observed in commercial 
fisheries from around the world (Figure 2). It is important to note, however, that the 
global dataset does have some much larger, slower growing species (bottom right of the 
figure) that are not represented by any of our modeled species. Our modeled fisheries do 
                                                     
1. All tables and figures are in the Annex. 
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not include any sharks or larger predatory fishes, and therefore our results should only be 
extrapolated to these types of fisheries with caution. Slow growing species are not only 
more vulnerable to overfishing, but are also less likely to be economically optimal to 
rebuild at higher discount rates.  
Beyond the life history traits examined in detail here, we argue that our modeled 
species are broadly representative of global commercial fisheries along other biological 
dimensions and economic and institutional dimensions, with some caveats discussed in 
our original report and elaborated upon below. Based on price data and unfished biomass, 
our modeled fisheries spanned a range of potential economic values (price per pound 
ranging from USD 0.13 to USD 15.36, in 2008 US dollars; unfished biomass ranging 
from ~1,200 to 20 000 000 metric tonnes; see OECD report). Our modeled fisheries use a 
range of different gear types and fleet types and include invertebrates, finfish, pelagic and 
reef-associated species. Targeted species reside in a range of different environments, 
although we do not have any exclusively tropical or polar species. In summary, our 
modeled fisheries are diverse enough to represent many of the common commercially 
fisheries found worldwide and therefore we believe that generalities arising from our 
results can be applied to fisheries in OECD countries.  
A notable ecological caveat is that certain species groups (e.g. sharks) and geographic 
areas (e.g. southern hemisphere) are not well-represented in the subset of species we 
selected, and may deserve further study if those groups/areas are of particular interest. 
However, the results of the analysis would not be fundamentally different since the 
parameter ranges spanned by our modeled fisheries includes the ranges for those 
groups/areas. We also note that we have not considered ecosystem impacts and feedbacks 
or interactions among multiple species or multiple ocean uses in our model of 
rebuilding—such topics will be important for future research.  
Regarding economic characteristics, the modeled fisheries are oriented toward North 
American industrialised nations and therefore under-represent some sets of economic 
conditions, such as those prevalent in small-scale artisanal and subsistence fisheries in 
Africa and Micronesia. We also do not attempt to distinguish between fisheries 
management structures (e.g. open access, limited access, catch shares). Further study 
would be necessary to examine systematic differences in results under different economic 
systems. As a first step toward understanding the effects of variation in economic 
structure on our results, see the ―changes in cost structure‖ analysis presented in our 
original report (Figure 8 and Table 9 in the OECD Report).  
Finally, detailed determination of the optimal policy for any particular species will 
always depend on species-specific parameterisation, and models that capture more detail 
of a particular fishery’s ecological and economic characteristics are always desirable as 
part of developing a rational rebuilding plan. The results presented in the OECD report 
are intended to provide general guidance when fishery-specific bioeconomic optimisation 
models are not available.  
Slow rebuilding strategy 
In the original OECD report, we examine three strategies for reaching a ―rebuilt‖ state 
from a ―collapsed‖ state: ―optimal‖ (V1opt), ―fast‖ (V1fast) and ―slow‖ (V1slow). In all 
three, the fishery begins in the collapsed state. In the optimal scenario, the fishery is 
rebuilt by fishing according to the economic optimum policy until the stock biomass 
exceeds 99% of the rebuilt state. In the fast scenario, the fishery is closed (i.e. effort=0) 
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until the stock biomass exceeds 99% of the rebuilt state, and thereafter fishing proceeds 
according to the optimal policy. In the slow scenario, fishing effort is 20% higher than 
effort for the optimal policy (Slow Effort = 1.2 * Optimal Effort, for each size class) for 
the time period it would have taken to rebuild, preventing the rebuilding threshold from 
being reached in the same time as it would have been under V1opt; the policy then reverts 
to the optimum until the biomass is within 99% of the rebuilt threshold. Values of all 
scenarios in this scenario set (V0, V1opt, V1fast, and V1slow) are calculated over the 
time horizon defined by the slowest rebuilding time (V1slow). When comparing the 
results for the slow and optimal rebuilding strategies, there was only a 1.5% reduction in 
value for the slow relative to the optimal strategy, suggesting that suboptimal 
management strategies that take longer to rebuild may result in little economic loss, while 
possibly having large social benefits. In this addendum, we have examined this slow 
strategy in more detail, and have compared it to an alternative slow strategy (―new 
slow‖), to determine if there truly is significant flexibility in management.  
Upon closer examination, we found that the slow strategy used in the OECD report is 
much closer to the optimal strategy in terms of fishing effort exerted than one might 
expect by the description ―20% higher effort than optimal‖. This occurs because the 
increase in effort over the optimal policy is multiplicative, and the optimal effort is often 
zero or near zero at the beginning of the rebuilding period. Thus, fishing effort early in 
the rebuilding period differed very little (or not at all, in the case of zero effort for the 
optimal) between the original slow and optimal policies. Therefore, it is not surprising 
that the economic value would be so similar, and we suggest caution before interpreting 
our results to indicate extremely flexible management options. The slow strategy we used 
was not really analogous to the fast strategy in terms of how much the strategy diverged 
from the optimal based on fishing effort.  
A slow strategy that is more comparable to the divergence captured by the fast 
strategy would instead apply an amount of fishing effort equal to 20% of the fishing effort 
in the collapsed state, added to the effort that would be exerted under the optimal policy, 
continuing for the time period it would have taken for the fishery to rebuild optimally 
(Slow Effort = [0.2 * Collapsed Effort] + Optimal Effort). The policy then reverts to the 
optimum to allow rebuilding to complete (i.e. until the biomass is within 99% of the 
rebuilt threshold). We will refer to this strategy as the ―new slow‖ strategy. This could 
also be referred to as a slower strategy, as rebuilding tends to take longer than it did for 
the original slow strategy used in the OECD report (Table 2).  
Table 2 and Figures 3 and 4 present the results of analyses using the new definition of 
the slow strategy, and show how they compare to the fast strategy and to the slow strategy 
used in the OECD report. The new slow strategy results in an average of 11.6% ± 3.2% 
(mean ± 1SD) reduction in value, expressed as a percentage of the optimal trajectory 
(Figure 3c). This is substantially greater than the reduction in value seen with the original 
slow rebuilding strategy (Figure 3b; mean ± 1SD = 1.5% ± 1.5%), and similar in 
magnitude to the reduction in value seen under the ―fast‖ rebuilding strategy (Figure 3a; 
mean ± 1SD = 12.3% ± 8.9%). Similar results are seen with respect to rebuilding times. 
The new slow strategy results in an average 5.6 ± 4.3 year (mean ± 1SD) increase in 
rebuilding time (Table 2). This is substantially greater than the increase in rebuilding time 
seen with the original slow rebuilding strategy (Table 2; mean ± 1SD = 1.8 ± 2.7 years), 
and similar in magnitude to the decrease in rebuilding time seen under the ―fast‖ 
rebuilding strategy (Table 2; mean ± 1SD = 5.4 ± 4.3 years).  
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These results highlight the fact that the magnitude of the reduction in value (and 
increase in rebuilding time) that occurs from employing a slower rebuilding strategy 
depends on how and by how much fishing effort exceeds the economically optimal effort 
level. An infinite number of slow rebuilding strategies are possible, and many will still 
result in economic benefits over maintaining the collapsed state. All such strategies will 
incur an economic loss relative to an optimal strategy, however, and will tend to increase 
rebuilding time. The new slow strategy suggests that these impacts can be substantial. 
However, in evaluating the degree of management flexibility in a real-world fishery, one 
would want to carefully consider how the details of the fast and slow alternatives 
presented here relate to real alternative management scenarios. The likely magnitude of 
the impacts of slower rebuilding would then have to be weighed against the other social 
goals that decision-makers are attempting to balance with economic benefits.  
Given that the new slow strategy better represents a comparable departure from the 
optimal strategy relative to the fast strategy, we provide a new examination of the 
trajectories of recovery to update the analysis provided in the OECD report (Figure 4). 
When we compare temporal patterns in stock biomass, catch and profits and for the 
optimal, new slow and fast rebuilding strategies, we find a broad range of dynamics 
across species and these three rebuilding tactics. Under the optimal policy, catch is 
initially reduced to an average of about 20% of its collapse level, but increases as stock 
biomass is rebuilt and typically surpasses collapsed-state catches within the first 30-40% 
of the rebuilding period. Net profits exceed that of the collapsed fishery sooner than catch 
because of rationalisation of fishing effort; on average this occurs before 10% of the 
rebuilding period has elapsed. In a small number of the fisheries (subtropical and 
temperate small pelagics, subtropical and warm temperate snappers, temperate rockfish), 
the optimum rebuilding policy requires a complete fishery closure. Under the slow 
rebuilding policy, catch is only reduced initially to an average of about 40% of its 
collapse level, stock biomass rebuilds more slowly, and as a consequence long-term 
catches are rapidly outpaced by the optimal policy. Average net profits are lower than 
those for the optimal policy at all times. For the fast strategy, in which the fishery is 
closed until it recovers, stock biomass rebuilds more quickly but catches and profits take 
longer to surpass collapse levels. The overall differences among optimal, fast, and slow 
strategies can be seen in the comparison of the ensemble mean trajectories (average 
across all fisheries) plotted in panels (d), (h), and (l) of Figure 4.  
Discount rate  
In the OECD report, we used a very low discount rate of 1% for the main analyses in 
the paper and also included a discount rate sensitivity analysis, examining how the results 
changed at somewhat higher discount rates (3% and 7%). We chose to center our results 
and discussion using the low discount rate for two main reasons. The first reason was 
philosophical, the second practical:  
 Rebuilding is usually conceived of as a long-term (inter-generational) social goal, for 
which public investment rates are most relevant. Moreover, there is considerable 
uncertainty regarding broader impacts of rebuilding; if not achieved, a variety of 
negative economic impacts not directly accounted for by the analysis may accrue.  
 At higher discount rates it is not economically optimal to rebuild some species; at 1%, 
all species were optimal to rebuild and we could therefore compare all species in the 
subset simultaneously at the same discount rate.  
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The first argument has been extensively debated in the literature, and a wide range of 
opinions exists on the ―proper‖ social discount rate (for recent reviews see Newell and 
Pizer [2004], Zhuang et al. [2007], and Azar [2009]), particularly for environmental 
problems for which the full ramifications of failure cannot be readily incorporated into a 
tractable economic analysis (Newall and Pizer 2004). We will not reiterate this debate 
here, but recognize that different discount rates may be appropriate dependent on 
subjective values, priorities, and economic characteristics of the user. For this reason, it is 
important to consider the implications of the particular choice of a discount rate on our 
results. We believe the second argument is an excellent reason for keeping the core 
discussion of our results centered on a 1% discount rate. However, this argument also 
underscores the need to identify at what discount rate a given type of fishery will switch 
from one for which it is optimal to rebuild to one for which rebuilding would occur at an 
economic loss relative to a policy that does not rebuild. Our original discount rate 
sensitivity analysis found that the character of the optimal policy function did not change 
substantially with increasing discount rate until reaching an abrupt switch point. At the 
switch point, the policy changes to one in which either the stock is rebuilt, but to a 
biomass lower than Bmsy, or alternatively one in which ―mining‖ of the remaining 
resources at collapse ensues (further collapsing and effectively eliminating the resource). 
The stability of the relative shape of the policy function up to the switch point provides 
support for focusing discussion on the 1% results, because the results are qualitatively 
similar for any discount rate greater than 1% but lower than the switch point. Our analysis 
of 3% and 7% discount rates approximately identified the switch point for some species, 
indicated by dots ―.‖ in some cells of Table 10 in the original report.  
In order to determine a more precise discount rate switch point for each of the 
modeled species, we have expanded our sensitivity analysis to look at a full spectrum of 
discount rates to determine for each fishery the discount rate above which it is no longer 
economically optimal to rebuild to at least the Bmsy threshold. This is a computationally 
challenging problem, requiring us to devise an efficient heuristic search algorithm that 
successfully identified discount rate switch points to within 1% for each fishery in our 
analysis. To find the discount rate switch point, we first examined our initial sensitivity 
analysis results (with discount rates of r=1%, 3%, and 7%). The annual net profit time 
series generated by the r=1% optimal policy was discounted at rates ranging from 0.01% 
to 99.99% and the annualised NPV (time horizon=100y) was plotted versus discount rate. 
Examining this curve, we observed that the switch point for every fishery lay in or near 
an interval defined by the minimum of the first derivative and the maximum of the second 
derivative of the NPV versus discount rate curve. We used this observation to define a 
range of integer percent discount rates over which to search for the switch point, which 
spanned 1% to either side of the range defined by nearest-integer-rounded 
minima/maxima of the appropriate derivative of the NPV vs. rate curve. For example, if 
[min(dNPV/dr), max(d2NPV/dr2)] = [4.1%, 6.8%], which rounds to [4%, 7%], then we 
searched the discount rate set {3%, 4%, 5%, 6%, 7%, 8%}. We eliminated some values 
from the search sets based on results of the preliminary sensitivity analysis with rates of 
3% and 7%. We then stepped through the search sets running the value function iteration 
(VFI) numerical optimisation algorithm (described in the original report) for each 
fishery/discount rate combination, starting from the midpoint rate for each fishery’s 
search set and updating the search set based on the results. Continuing the example given 
above, if rebuilding was optimal at 5%, then we know it is also optimal at 4% and do not 
need to run the optimisation for that value. Similarly, if rebuilding is not optimal at 7%, it 
will not be optimal at 8% either. In this example, knowing the results at 5% and 7% 
would allow us to limit our subsequent search set to the single rate {6%}. The estimated 
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switch point represents the highest discount rate at which rebuilding to at least the Bmsy 
threshold was optimal, at the 1% resolution of our numerical analysis. Rather than run the 
VFI algorithm for all 100 years required to calculate the final policy and value functions, 
we stopped the VFI if the policy function was observed to have diverged from the optimal 
policy (indicating that the rate being tested was above the switch point).  
In Table 3, we report the discount switch point and the changes in relative rebuilding 
values as one moves from the r=1% case to the r=3% or r=7% case. We provide two 
alternative calculations of the mean and standard deviation of percent changes in relative 
rebuilding value resulting from changes in discount rate. First, we present the original 
calculation which excluded fisheries for which rebuilding was not economically optimal 
at a given discount rate (Table 3; note that a minor error in the original calculation of the 
standard deviation has been corrected). Second, we present the calculation including all 
species, assigning a percent change in value of -100% to any fishery that was not optimal 
to rebuild at a given discount rate. Obviously, the latter calculations lead to larger average 
percent reductions in value. These reductions in value reflect the joint effects of two 
phenomena that occur with increasing discount rate: fisheries become non-optimal to 
rebuild, and subtler changes occur in the character of the relative rebuilding policy 
(which, on their own, tend to reduce but can in some cases increase relative rebuilding 
value).  
On average, the discount rate at which the optimal policy switches from rebuilding to 
non-rebuilding is 6% ± 2.6% (range: 2% to 10%) (Table 3). For relatively simple 
resource production functions, it can be established analytically that it may be optimal to 
harvest a fishery to the brink of biological extinction and put the money in the bank when 
the economic discount rate (δ) is greater than the intrinsic growth rate of fish biomass (r) 
(Clark 1973). Under the same simple model, the economically optimal strategy will 
always be to drive the fish stock to extinction when δ > 2r (Clark 1973). Such a criterion 
has not been analytically established for the more realistic size-structured model that we 
have employed here, but it is reasonable to expect a relationship between the growth rate 
of vulnerable stock biomass near collapse and the discount rate switch point. We would 
expect the δ > 2r criterion to be an upper bound on the discount rate switch point, since 
we have defined the switch point to occur when it is no longer economically optimal to 
rebuild to Bmsy, whereas Clark’s (1973) results were formulated in terms of biological 
extinction. Nonetheless, the δ > 2r criterion derived from Clark’s model provides a useful 
benchmark to place our results in the context of more general theory.  
We therefore examine the empirical relationship between the discount rate switch 
point estimated from our numerical analysis, and the intrinsic rate of biomass increase for 
our modeled stocks at collapse (Figure 5). Because our model incorporates a size-
dependent vulnerability and deals with commercial collapse (rather than extinction) as an 
alternative outcome to rebuilding, we estimate the intrinsic growth rate of vulnerable 
biomass as the natural log of the finite rate of increase of the vulnerable biomass growth 
curve as biomass approaches the collapse level. This provides an analogous calculation 
for comparison with Clark’s (1973) simpler model. Empirically, we find a positive log-
linear relationship between intrinsic growth rate and the discount rate switch point 
(dashed black line in Figure 5, R2=64%, p<0.001). As expected from theory, the discount 
rate switch point always occurs at discount rate δ ≤ 2r, and the discount rate switch point 
increases with increasing growth rate. The empirical results suggest that rebuilding is 
unlikely to be optimal at any reasonable discount rate for species with extremely low 
growth rates (r<0.03, i.e. a doubling time of >23 years). However, rebuilding is found to 
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be optimal for all species with growth rates>0.3 (doubling times <2.3 years) for discount 
rates ≤ 6%.  
A recent empirical analysis suggests that given reasonable assumptions about prices, 
costs and discount rates, it may be economically optimal to harvest fish sustainably, even 
for low growth rates and high discount rates (Grafton et al. 2007). Our results indicate 
that rebuilding can also be economically optimal for reasonable discount rates (2-10%) 
for all but the slowest-growing species (r ≥ about 0.03). We note that Grafton et al. 
(2007) model included an increasing cost of fishing at low density and a fixed component 
of fishing costs, both of which could raise the discount rate switch point in our analyses; 
therefore, our switch point analysis could be considered conservative. This could be 
explored by expanded numerical studies that included a range of fixed costs and 
functional forms of the cost curve. The distribution of discount rate switch points among 
fisheries has important implications for rebuilding policy. First, we note that the average 
discount rate switch point of 6%, and the switch points for more than three-quarters of the 
analyzed fisheries (14 out of 18), are greater than typical discount rates used in public 
policy analysis (for reference, the average US OMB nominal discount rate over the period 
from 1990-2010 was approximately 5.6%), indicating that it will often be economically 
optimal to rebuild a single fishery even when other oft-cited benefits of rebuilding are not 
considered (for example, non-consumptive uses and improved ecosystem function). 
However, our results also underscore the critical role that economic structure and policy 
can play in determining whether a fishery will, in a purely economic sense, be optimal to 
rebuild. Implied discount rates in modern fisheries, estimated by a variety of indirect 
methods range from 1% to >50% (Asche, 1999; Akroyd et al., 1999; Asche, 2001). Thus, 
economic policies and financing mechanisms that promote the application of lower 
discount rates should be a critical part of any effort to promote fishery rebuilding from the 
standpoint of single-stock economic benefits. Without sufficiently low discount rates, no 
economically optimal policy that also meets rebuilding goals will exist. There is evidence 
that secure property rights systems, such as ITQs, can reduce discount rates to within the 
range of the discount rate switch points found here (Akroyd et al., 1999; Asche, 2001).  
The broader issue of choosing appropriate discount rates for long-term social cost-
benefit analysis is complex and actively debated in the literature (see, for example, recent 
reviews by Newell and Pizer, 2004; Zhuang, 2007; and Azar, 2009), and a detailed 
discussion is beyond the scope of this document. Generally speaking, rates of of 3-10% 
are widely used for intra-generational (shorter term) projects, with typical values between 
5-7%. Rates in the range of 0.5% to 4% are often proposed for longer-term, inter-
generational projects, with typical values between 2-3% (Newell and Pizer 2004, Zhuang 
et al. 2007, Azar 2009). For example, the US Environmental Protection Agency 
analytical guidance for cost-benefit analysis suggests intra-generational projects use rates 
in the 2–3% range subject to sensitivity analysis in the range of 2–3% and at 7%, and that 
inter-generational projects use rates in the range 0.5–3% with sensitivity analyses in that 
range and at 7% (summarised in Zhuang et al., 2007). Based on the subset of species in 
our analysis and our new analysis of the discount rate switch point, between 44% and 
72% of fisheries would be economically optimal to rebuild given a 5-7% range of 
discount rates, and between 78% and 100% of fisheries would be economically optimal to 
rebuild with discount rates in the 2-3% range.  
As a final point, we note that one can always find an economically optimal way to 
rebuild a fish stock if the rebuilding threshold is incorporated directly into the analysis as 
a constraint (in economic terms, the requirement that the fishery be rebuilt at least to a 
specified threshold is made endogenous). However, when rebuilding is ―forced‖ by 
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incorporating an endogenous constraint, the resulting policy is only optimal subject to this 
constraint – and therefore is not appropriate for broader policy debates considering 
whether or not to rebuild. Our approach differs in that it examines the global optimum 
economic policy (over a specified long planning horizon) and applies it to determine the 
trajectory of the fishery from collapse—which allows for the possibility that rebuilding 
may not in fact be the economically optimal outcome. The discount rate switch point 
analysis presented here is a useful supplement to our original results in that it identifies 
the range of discount rates under which rebuilding would be the economically optimal 
decision. In cases where a decision has already been made to rebuild, then it may be 
desirable to calculate economically optimal policies with an endogenous rebuilding 
constraint. For example, Larkin (2000) outlined an approach that incorporates such a 
constraint and calculated net present values of rebuilding trajectories under different time 
frames for a hypothetical fishery with discount rates ranging from 0% to 24%. 
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Addendum Annex 
 
Tables and figures 
Table 1. Selected life history characteristics for the modeled species from the OECD report  
and a survey of global commercial fishery species.  
Modelled Species   
Fishery ID Linf K M Lrepro 
1 25.8 0.38 0.8 15.9 
2 15.9 2.04 2.18 11 
3 118.1 0.19 0.18 64.8 
4 14.7 0.38 0.11 4 
5 66.9 0.29 0.23 26.7 
6 43.8 0.24 0.12 16.6 
7 44.7 0.53 0.18 20.9 
8 119.4 0.34 0.21 82 
9 60.9 0.3 0.28 37 
10 19 0.34 0.39 7.25 
11 49.5 0.05 0.04 34 
12 51 0.21 0.21 28.1 
13 89.4 0.25 0.11 30.1 
14 35.8 0.15 0.13 28.3 
15 130 0.13 0.24 39.5 
16 107.9 0.13 0.1 48 
17 8.2 0.6 1.52 5 
18 47.3 0.26 0.2 28.9 
Global Commercial Fisheries   
Statistics Linf K M Lrepro 
Sample size 927 972 362 438 
Maximum 1683 12 11.3 961 
95th percentile  201 1.4 2.22 109.6 
5th percentile  17.1 0.09 0.11 10.1 
Minimum  2 0.03 0.03 2.1 
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Table 2. Length of rebuilding period (in years) for optimal,  
fast and two alternative slow rebuilding scenarios 
Fishery 
ID 
Optimal Fast Slow, original report Slow, new 
  Rebuilding  
time 
Δ from  
optimal 
Rebuilding  
time 
Δ from  
original 
Rebuilding 
time 
Δ from  
original 
1 8 7 -1 9 1 10 +2 
2 4 2 -2 4 0 5 +1 
3 5 3 -2 5 0 7 +2 
4 15 5 -10 16 1 26 +11 
5 6 3 -3 7 1 9 +3 
6 10 4 -6 10 0 13 +3 
7 8 7 -1 8 0 11 +3 
8 8 4 -4 8 0 11 +3 
9 7 2 -5 7 0 12 +5 
10 6 2 -4 6 0 10 +4 
11 26 19 -7 29 3 34 +8 
12 22 6 -6 29 7 36 +14 
13 17 6 -11 18 1 26 +9 
14 5 4 -1 6 1 7 +2 
15 19 3 -16 28 9 33 +14 
16 12 4 -8 18 6 18 +6 
17 4 4 0 5 1 5 +1 
18 24 14 -10 25 1 33 +9 
Mean 11.4 5.5 -5.4 13.2 1.8 17 +5.6 
Stdev 7.2 4.4 4.3 9.1 2.7 11.1 +4.3 
Changes from the optimal rebuilding time are shown in italics alongside the three alternative policies 
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Table 3. Effects of three discount rates (r=1%, 3%, 7%)1 on the relative value µ 
of optimal economic rebuilding (V1opt) and these estimated discount rate switch point 
ID (V1opt-V0)/V0 1 
Discount 
rate switch 
point 2 
Change in  
(V1opt-V0)/V0 
Change in  
(V1opt-V0)/V0 
 r=1% r=3% r=7%  Δ(1 to 3%) Δ(1 to 7%) Δ(1 to 3%) Δ(1 to 
3%) 
1 1.66 . . 2% . . -100% -100% 
2 61.19 60.79 60.01 10% -1% -2% -1% -2% 
3 1.78 1.78 . 6% 0% . 0% -100% 
4 4.03 3.88 3.39 8% -4% -16% -4% -16% 
5 3.9 4.6 3.57 8% 18% -9% 18% -9% 
6 2.23 1.76 . 6% -21% . -21% -100% 
7 1.59 . . 2% . . -100% -100% 
8 3.88 4.22 1.78 8% 9% -54% 9% -54% 
9 4.01 3.95 3.92 8% -1% -2% -1% -2% 
10 2.73 2.69 2.53 8% -2% -7% -2% -7% 
11 0.75 . . 2% . . -100% -100% 
12 2.89 . . 2% . . -100% -100% 
13 3.52 3.31 . 6% -6% . -6% -100% 
14 1.18 1.24 1.59 8% 5% 34% 5% 34% 
15 4.47 4.39 . 6% -2% . -2% -100% 
16 2.27 1.98 . 6% -13% . -13% -100% 
17 0.08 0.06 0.02 8% -28% -80% -28% -80% 
18 2.31 2.28 . 4% -1% . -1% -100% 
Mean 2.55 3 2.78 3 2.40 3 6% -3% -17% -25% -63% 
Stdev 1.28 3 1.40 3 1.38 3 2.60% 12% 35% 43% 48% 
The Change in relative value is calculated excluding fisheries for which it is no longer economically optimal to rebuild (as in OECD 
report) and including these fisheries (final two columns; fisheries for which it is no longer optimal to rebuild have a 100% decrease 
in relative rebuilding value) 
1.  Missing values (.) denote cases in which the economic optimum policy did not result in rebuilding vulnerable stock biomass to at 
least the Bmsy threshold.  
2.  Estimated within 1% using the algorithm described in this Addendum. Highest discount rate at which rebuilding to ≥ Bmsy 
th.reshold is the economically optimal policy.  
3  Species 2 was excluded from these calculations to limit effect of this species’ extremely high relative rebuilding value. 
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Figure 1. Principal components analysis (PCA) of representativeness  
of our modeled species (red)  
 
Note: in comparison to the distribution for global commercial marine fishery species 
worldwide for which four basic life history parameters were available (Linf, k, M, and 
Lrepro; n=202 species; black). (a) Biplot of leading principal components, which 
together explained 85% of the variance in these four life history parameters. (b) and 
(c) Cumulative distribution functions for PC1 and PC2 of subset (red) and global 
marine fishery species (black). Statistical tests on cumulative distribution functions 
indicated that subset distributions did not significantly differ from the global 
distribution (see text for details). 
  
THE ECONOMIC VALUE OF REBUILDING FISHERIES– 65 
 
OECD FOOD, AGRICULTURE AND FISHERIES WORKING PAPER N°55 © OECD 2012 
Figure 2. Von Bertalanffy growth rate versus asymptotic maximum (k, Linf) 
 
Note: For a broad survey of all commercial marine fishery species worldwide for which k and Linf 
estimates were available (n=927 species), shown by the black dots, and for the modeled species from the 
OECD report, shown by red triangles 
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Figure 3. Reduction in rebuilding value under alternative scenarios (fast, old slow, new slow),  
as a percentage of the optimal value of rebuilding 
 
Note: (a) Fast rebuilding policy (100%*[V1opt-V1fast]/V1opt). (b) Original slow rebuilding policy (100%*[V1opt-
V1slow]/V1opt). (c) New slow rebuilding policy (100%*[V1opt-V1slow, new]/V1opt). Note that the calculation of 
these percentages differs somewhat from the calculations in Figure 3 of the original report, to more clearly show 
how the reductions relate to the optimal value of the fishery. 
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Figure 4. Dynamics of rebuilding under economically optimal fishing policy (V1opt, 1st column)  
and alternative policies (fast, new slow) 
 
Note: Dashed grey lines show trajectories from collapsed to rebuilt states for each hypothetical fishery, and 
solid black line shows the ensemble mean. Time is scaled to the length of the rebuilding period, so that values 
on the horizontal axis represent the fraction of the rebuilding period that has elapsed. (a,b,c) Stock biomass 
(Bt) as a fraction of biomass at MSY (BMSY). (d) Ensemble mean biomass trajectories for optimal, fast, and 
new slow policies compared. (e,f,g) Catch (Ht) relative to harvest in the collapsed state (Hcollapse). (h) 
Ensemble mean harvest trajectories for optimal, fast, and new slow policies compared. (i,j,k) Annual net profit 
(πt) relative to the collapsed state (πcollapse). (l) Ensemble mean annual net profit trajectories for optimal, 
fast, and new slow policies compared. Species 2 is excluded from profit panels because of its extremely high 
value. Horizontal reference lines are plotted at 1.0. 
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Figure 5. Switch point discount rates (δ) plotted versus growth rates  
of vulnerable stock biomass at collapse ® 
 
Note: Intrinsic growth rates were calculated as the natural logarithm of the finite rate of increase of the vulnerable 
biomass growth curve evaluated at the Bcollapse reference point. Red solid line indicates Clark’s (1973) criterion: 
for the simpler model of fish biomass dynamics he analyzed, δ>2r was sufficient to imply that it would be 
economically optimal to drive the resource to extinction and invest the money, rather than continue to fish. Black 
dashed line shows the least squares regression fit to log-transformed variables (ln(δ) = 0.50 ln(r) - 2.45, R2=0.64, 
p<0.001). Note Log10 scale on both axes. 
